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Abstract 
 
The present study uses a standard hedonic log–log framework to analyze rent 
variations in the Norwegian housing market. Using data from the national rental 
survey (Leiemarkedsundersøkelsen) as a basis, this study finds that geographical 
variables, hedonic qualities, and tenant–landlord characteristics explain 49 percent 
of total rent variations across regions. Unlike previous studies, we compose 
several interaction variables indicating, for example, the effect of the number of 
bedrooms for a given dwelling size and the effect of access to an elevator given 
various floor levels. We also use several dummy variables to study the effect of 
tenure length, which has not been adequately examined in other research. This 
study further acknowledges that tenants limit their choices of housing services by 
property type and location, thereby confining themselves to specific submarkets. 
This results in distinct price functions for each submarket. Our findings should be 
of importance to market makers such as appraisers, property managers, and real 
estate analysts. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Studies of the valuation of rental housing attributes have been conducted for 
numerous markets. However, few such studies have been done of the Norwegian 
rental market. Rental prices are a function of numerous housing characteristics, 
which, in turn, affect the property’s value. This should be of importance to 
appraisers who make market-derived rent adjustments, property managers, 
developers that design real estate projects, and investors. This paper examines six 
issues that affect rental prices for the Norwegian market, both for the aggregate 
market and for different submarkets. 
1.1 Property-specific hedonic attributes 
Tenants prefer certain attributes, which increases their willingness to pay for such 
residences, all else being equal. Conversely, certain restrictions and external 
factors can have a negative impact on rent. This study examines the physical 
characteristics of residences and their physical characteristics of the 
neighborhood. Among the variables we control for are a private balcony and 
designated parking, both variables tested in studies of multifamily houses by 
Sirmans et al. (1989, 1990). Based on a linear model, the authors found that 
amenities including designated parking and a private balcony were valued by 
tenants. We propose such variables are associated with increased rent, but are 
frequently correlated with low-density locations, which can offset the effect. 
Other attributes we control for are the size of the residence, the number of 
bedrooms for a given dwelling size, and whether the residence is furnished. 
Gunterman and Norrbin (1987) ran a regression analysis of rent variations in a 
university submarket and found that an extra bedroom for a given apartment unit 
size has a significant positive effect on rental price. A study of student rentals by 
Marshall (1990) found that the number of bedrooms and residence size have a 
positive impact on the rental price. Smith and Belloit (1987) found that amenities 
such as a dishwasher, rentals that include all utilities, and furnished units have a 
significantly positive effect on rent. Furthermore, The number of bathrooms and 
bedrooms also had a significantly positive impact on rental price, while leasing 
period, neighborhood quality, and location convenience had a significantly 
negative impact in terms of affecting rental price. These studies show that 
amenities, services, and physical characteristics affect rent, but their data yield 
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different estimates for the factors. This may be due to location, since different 
populations have different preferences, and will be further examined in this study. 
1.2 Location 
Several studies validate the effect of location on rental prices, which will be 
controlled for in this study. Allen et al. (1973) measured the importance of a 
central location and found that the distance to an economic focal point 
significantly affects rent in all submarkets tested (the apartment market, the 
single-family market, etc.), as well as in the aggregate market. Ogur (1973) found 
that colleges and universities have a significant effect on rental markets, causing 
an increase in rental prices in nearby areas. This finding was confirmed by Jaffe 
and Bussa (1975), who found that rent declined as the distance from a university 
increased. Jaffe and Bussa (1977), and Prave and Ord (1987) also confirm the 
importance of proximity to an economic focal point such as a city center or 
campus. Gunterman and Norrbin (1987) emphasized that accessibility-related 
factors inherent to a particular location—proximity to employment/campus, 
distance to an economic focal point, and so forth is often difficult to determine 
successfully in empirical studies. Our study does not encounter this problem, 
since our location variable is at the county level. This is, however, unfortunate, 
since a district-level variable would be of great interest, especially in Oslo, where 
the prices vary significantly between districts. 
1.3 Landlord characteristics 
Little research has been conducted on the relation between market rent and 
landlord size, but Larsen and Sommervoll (2006) found that small-scale landlords 
tend to set lower rents than large-scale landlords. Our study examines the impact 
of landlord characteristics, focusing on the difference between small-scale and 
large-scale landlords. It is expected that large-scale landlords set higher rents, 
since they are likely to know more about the market and are thus better able to 
diversify risk. Large-scale landlords accept that some contracts may be 
problematic, allowing for a higher incidence of exits and/or damage to the 
property. Such landlords may therefore include premiums in their rent as 
insurance against vacancy or depreciation. Small-scale landlords are often the 
tenant’s neighbor. This leads to a selection process that is motivated not only by 
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revenue, but also by the tenant’s personality, giving the landlord incentive to give 
discounts in order to be more selective. 
1.4 Tenant characteristics 
As in Larsen and Sommervoll (2006), our dataset includes information on 
education level and whether the tenant is living alone. Larsen and Sommervoll 
(2006) found these variables to have a statistically significant impact on rent, and 
our analysis controls for them. Additionally, our study contains a variable for the 
tenant´s income level. Education and income level are expected to be correlated, 
which may force us to omit one of the variables to avoid multicollinearity. These 
variables are all assumed to be observable by the landlord and, though not a 
guarantee, provide signals of good tenants. 
1.5 Landlord–tenant relationship 
The effect of the landlord–tenant relationship on rent has not been widely 
explored. Larsen and Sommervoll (2006) found indications of reduced rent when 
there was a direct or indirect relationship between the lessor and the tenant. The 
authors explain this result with a hypothesis of reduced risk due to more 
information. 
 The present study controls for this effect and examines whether the 
relationship between the landlord and tenant affects rental price. Such a 
relationship, either direct or indirect, is expected to reduce rent. This is supported 
by basic risk–return theory, since prior knowledge of the tenant reduces risk and 
the landlord is therefore likely to give the tenant a discount on rent. 
1.6 Length of residence 
The academic literature on rental contracts has determined that landlords attempt 
to minimize costs relating to turnover by giving discounts to long-term tenants. 
Merrill (1977), Lowery (1981), and Marshall and Guasch (1983) all found a 
substantial discount on rent associated with tenure length. On the other hand, 
Goodman and Kawai (1985) found that the transaction costs of moving act as an 
incentive for tenants to “grow into” a living unit, thereby allowing a rise in rent. 
This finding is supported by Barker (2003), who finds that residences with low 
turnover costs charge long-term tenants higher rent than short-term tenants. The 
author further shows that length-of-residence discounts are less common than 
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discounts on the first month’s rent for new tenants. Hanushek and Quigley (1980 
and Ihlanfeldt (1981) also support this, arguing that a tenant’s search and moving 
costs are incentives for households to consider “equilibrium–disequilibrium,” that 
is, choosing a suboptimal housing bundle for the household to grow into based on 
expectations of family size and income, thereby allowing small future adjustments 
in rent. 
 We further examine the effect of length of residence on rent. We propose 
that length of residence has a negative effect on rental price. A tenant that has paid 
rent on time and takes good care of the residence is likely to be preferred over 
new tenants and their associated risk. Landlords may therefore be willing to 
reduce rent through negotiations or, more likely, bypass nominal rent adjustments. 
1.7 Rental submarkets 
Straszheim (1973), Schnare and Struyk (1976), Sonstelie and Portney (1980), 
Goodman (1978), and Allen et al. (1973) have proposed different methods for 
identifying housing submarkets. Their different criteria include geographic and 
political boundaries, property types, and household characteristics. This study 
focuses on submarkets defined by three property types: studios, apartments, and 
houses. Furthermore, we focus on market segmentation based on regional 
differences. To obtain a sufficiently large sample, we focus on the regions that 
contain the largest cities in Norway. 
According to the hedonic framework defined by Rosen (1974), each rental 
market attribute has an observable market price. The implicit prices should be 
stable in more carefully defined submarkets within a well-defined rental market. 
When consumers’ choices are limited to specific locations or property types, 
however, the rent-determining process is limited to the different submarkets, 
resulting in different price functions for each one. We therefore suggest 
determining differences in all the submarkets defined by either property type or 
regional affiliation. 
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2 The sample 
2.1 Rental market survey 
The sample consists of 9,226 observations collected by Statistics Norway’s yearly 
rental market surveys on 28,000 rental residences in Norway for the period 
October 2009 to February 2010. Statistics Norway started collecting data in 2005 
for research on the Norwegian rental market. A complete register of such rentals 
does not, however, exist. A combination of different governmental registers 
administered by Statistics Norway is therefore used to maximize the number of 
observations. In 2010, Statistics Norway used the following procedure for sample 
allocation: - Owner information from Statistics Norway’s Ground Property, Address 
and Building Register was matched to data from the National Population 
Register to remove owner-occupied dwellings. - Information on organizational structure from Statistics Norway’s 
Corporate and Business Register was matched to the residential register to 
remove cooperative shareholders and institutions. 
 
The sample consisted of 18,000 residences, with an oversampling of 2,000 
residences from the county Oslo due to the significant attention on this residential 
rental market and volatility in rental prices across its submarkets. Furthermore, 
8,000 observations from residences inhabited by 20- to 29-year-olds were 
stochastically added to increase the allocation from all municipalities. This was 
done to address the potential problem of students registered at a parent’s residence 
while living elsewhere. Since around half of this segment lives in rental 
residences,1
 
 age is a significant criterion. The regional share of this segment is 
uniformly distributed throughout the population. A precise description of the 
sample is illustrated in Table 2.1. 
 
                                                 1 Statistics Norway Report 2004/28. 
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Gross 
sample 
% 
Net 
responses 
% of gross 
Net 
sample 
% of gross 
Total  28,000     100.0% 9,226 33.0%  6,114     21.8% 
Region  % of region  % of region  % of region 
Oslo  6,328     22.6 % 2,788 30.2 %  1,794     29.3 % 
Akershus  2,072     7.4 % 725 7.9 %  493     8.1 % 
Hedmark and 
Oppland  1,708     6.1 % 576 6.2 %  374     6.1 % 
Østlandet  4,508     16.1 % 1,309 14.2 %  936     15.3 % 
Agder & Rogaland  4,480     16.0 % 988 10.7 %  667     10.9 % 
Vestlandet  4,200     15.0 % 1,421 15.4 %  893     14.6 % 
Midt-Norge  2,296     8.2 % 744 8.1 %  483     7.9 % 
Nord-Norge  2,408     8.6 % 675 7.3 %  474     7.8 % 
Age  % of Age  % of Age  % of Age 
Under 25  5,292     18.9 % 1,141 12.4 %  895     14.6 % 
25–44  15,736     56.2 % 4,765 51.6 %  3,310     54.1 % 
45–66  4,984     17.8 % 2,400 26.0 %  1,529     25.0 % 
67 and older  1,988     7.1 % 920 10.0 %  380     6.2 % 
Education  % of Edu.  % of Edu.  % of Edu. 
Elementary school  7,672     27.4 % 2,456 26.6 %  1,741     28.5 % 
Secondary School  11,396     40.7 % 3,189 34.6 %  2,028     33.2 % 
Higher education  5,656     20.2 % 2,433 26.4 %  1,465     24.0 % 
Not answered  3,276     11.7 % 1,148 12.4 %  880     14.4 % 
 
Table 2.1 Gross sample data, net response data, and net data after imputation and truncation. 
 
2.2 Exclusions 
Of the 28,000 observations in the original sample, 31 were removed because the 
residence was owned by an institution, had been destroyed by fire, or had been 
condemned. Certain residences were dismissed because they did not want to or 
could not participate in the survey. In addition, a number of residences were 
unreachable. Total exclusions amounted to 18,774 residences, or 67.05 percent of 
the total sample. A total of 85.4 percent of exclusions were related to problems 
with contacting residences, which occurred in 57.2 percent of observations in the 
gross sample. Refusals comprised 14.6 percent of total exclusions. 
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2.3 Truncation  
Variable Criteria description Observation losses Sample size 
Monthly rent Did not answer monthly rent 2,592 6,704 
Size Did not answer exact or interval size 306 6,378 
Tenure length Did not answer length of residence 41 6,337 
Ownership Answered owner of real estate 107 6,230 
 
Table 2.3.a Excluded observations. 
 
Of the 9,226 residences that answered the survey, some observations had to be 
excluded due to incomplete answers on key factors: 2,592 observations were 
removed because they did not report the monthly rent, another 306 observations 
were removed because the interviewed subject did not respond to questions 
regarding residence size, and 41 respondents did not state what year their tenure 
started. We also excluded 107 observations where the interviewed object (IO) 
listed himself or herself as the owner of the dwelling. A total of 412 respondents 
did not answer the question and were therefore designated as tenants, allowing us 
to use the remainder of their data. 
 Further, we are only interested in modeling the “normal” population, 
leading us to truncate some outliers. The remaining sample is described in Table 
2.3.b 
 
Variable Criteria description Observation losses Sample size 
Monthly rent [1,000, 25,000] NOK 47 6,183 
Size [10, 300] square meters 19 6,164 
Tenure length [0, 20] years 20 6,144 
 
Table 2.3.b Truncated data. 
 
Our truncation process mainly involved the key aspects of rent, residence size, 
and tenure length. While monthly rent ranged from zero to 76,945 NOK, to obtain 
a representative sample of residences we selected those observations with monthly 
rent in the range of 1,000 NOK to 25,000 NOK, losing 47 observations. Second, 
we limited our sample by imposing a size constraint of 10 square meters to 300 
square meters, thereby dropping 19 observations. Third, we did not include 
observations with tenures longer than 20 years, since longer tenures are likely to 
suffer from idiosyncratic components and offer little insight into current rental 
information. (Larsen and Sommervoll, 2006) 
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2.4 Imputation 
In the survey, the IOs had two alternatives when answering the question on 
residence size: The first and optimal alternative was to state an accurate size and 
the second alternative was a multiple choice answer based on 7 ranges, intended 
for those who did not know the exact size. These ranges were; less than 20 square 
meters, from 20 to 29 square meters, 30 to 39 square meters etc., up to 119 square 
meters where the range were 120 square meter or more. Several IOs answered 
with both an exact size and a range, the latter of which was ignored. When the 
interval option was chosen, the value was set to the mean of the interval; for 
example, 70 square meters was input as the dwelling size when the option 60–80 
square meters was selected. By including observations that only stated an interval 
size, we avoided omitting 787 observations. Observations in the uppermost 
interval (over 120 square meters) were replaced by the mean of the size of all 
observations between 120 and 300 square meters, from the accurate responses. 
This led to an increase in the mean number of square meters from 72.25 to 72.28, 
a change that is statically insignificant. The final sample comprised 6,114 
observations. 
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2.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.5 reports descriptive statistics for the variables in this study for 2010.  
Variable Interval data Continuous data Aggregate data 
 Mean  Variance Mean  Variance Mean  Variance 
Rent 5,744 2,937* 6,527 3,008* 6,428 3,010* 
Location:        
Akershus  5.8 % 0.055 8.4 % 0.077 8.1 % 0.074 
Aust-Agder 1.3 % 0.013 1.4 % 0.014 1.4 % 0.014 
Buskerud 3.6 % 0.034 4.1 % 0.039 4.0 % 0.039 
Finnmark 2.2 % 0.021 1.2 % 0.012 1.3 % 0.013 
Hedmark 3.7 % 0.036 2.9 % 0.028 3.0 % 0.029 
Hordaland 10.5 % 0.094 9.2 % 0.084 9.4 % 0.085 
Møre og Romsdal 4.8 % 0.046 3.6 % 0.035 3.8 % 0.036 
Nordland 4.3 % 0.041 2.9 % 0.028 3.0 % 0.030 
Nord-Trøndelag 1.9 % 0.019 1.4 % 0.014 1.5 % 0.015 
Oppland 5.8 % 0.055 2.7 % 0.026 3.1 % 0.030 
Oslo 21.1 % 0.167 30.5 % 0.212 29.3 % 0.207 
Østfold 5.1 % 0.048 4.8 % 0.045 4.8 % 0.046 
Rogaland 8.5 % 0.078 6.7 % 0.062 6.9 % 0.064 
Sogn og Fjordane 2.2 % 0.021 1.3 % 0.013 1.4 % 0.014 
Sør-Trøndelag 6.5 % 0.061 6.4 % 0.060 6.4 % 0.060 
Telemark 3.2 % 0.031 2.1 % 0.021 2.3 % 0.022 
Troms 2.4 % 0.024 3.5 % 0.034 3.4 % 0.033 
Vest-Agder 2.4 % 0.024 2.6 % 0.026 2.6 % 0.025 
Vestfold 4.7 % 0.045 4.2 % 0.040 4.2 % 0.040 
Hedonic attributes:        
Size 72.613 29.27* 72.286 36.7* 72.328 35.836* 
Studio 4.3 % 0.041 4.5 % 0.043 4.5 % 0.043 
One bedroom 39.8 % 0.240 44.7 % 0.247 44.1 % 0.247 
Two bedroom 31.7 % 0.217 31.6 % 0.216 31.6 % 0.216 
Three bedrooms 15.2 % 0.129 13.6 % 0.117 13.8 % 0.119 
Four bedrooms 7.0 % 0.065 4.3 % 0.041 4.6 % 0.044 
Five bedrooms 1.5 % 0.015 1.0 % 0.010 1.1 % 0.011 
Six bedrooms 0.6 % 0.006 0.3 % 0.003 0.4 % 0.004 
Floor level 2.347 2.387* 2.800 2.616 2.743 2.592 
Elevator 6.7 % 0.063 9.5 % 0.086 9.1 % 0.083 
Balcony 62.8 % 0.234 59.0 % 0.242 58.8 % 0.242 
Furnished 26.9 % 0.197 24.6 % 0.185 24.7 % 0.186 
Ln(High standard) 0.774 0.248 89.6 % 0.246 85.8 % 0.261 
Characteristics:        
High income 14.1 % 0.122 39.5% 0.156 18.1 % 0.148 
Single 54.5 % 0.248 44.0% 0.247 45.3 % 0.248 
Private landlord 44.1 % 0.247 45.2% 0.248 45.0 % 0.498 
Multi-complex owner 14.7 % 0.126 22.0% 0.171 21.0 % 0.166 
Relative or friend 11.4 % 0.101 11.4% 0.101 11.4 % 0.101 
Market mediation 28.1 % 0.202 42.1% 0.244 40.3 % 0.241 
Tenure length 0–1 year 55.0 % 0.248 1.4% 0.014 11.6 % 0.014 
Tenure length 2–5 years 67.9 % 0.218 71.1% 0.206 54.9 % 0.248 
Tenure length 6–10 years 17.3 % 0.143 14.9% 0.127 15.2 % 0.129 
Tenure length 11–15 
years 6.9 % 0.064 5.1% 
0.049 
5.4 % 0.051 
Tenure length 16–20 
years 1.7 % 0.016 
2.4% 0.023 
2.3 % 0.022 
 
Table 2.5 Descriptive statistics, 2010. Here * denotes standard deviation. 
Thesis MSc Business and Economics GRA 19002  01.09.2011 
 
 
The results in percentages in Table 2.5 are dummy variables indicating the 
number of respondents in the sample with a positive value for the corresponding 
variable. In addition to showing the aggregate data, Table 2.5 divides the sample 
into interval data and continuous data to illustrate the differences between 
respondents who reported dwelling size with an interval and those who reported 
the exact size. For some of the variables the difference are quite noteworthy, 
though without an intuitive explanation why. 
 
3 Theoretical framework 
 
This study applies the hedonic framework used by Larsen and Sommervoll 
(2006). Freeman introduced this framework in 2003, building on the contributions 
of Rosen (1974). The hedonic hypothesis states that goods do not, per se, provide 
utility to the consumer, but are instead valued for their utility-bearing attributes 
(Lancaster, 1966). Such an extension enables studies of heterogeneous goods 
within the framework of classical consumer theory and creates a direct link 
between the market price and attributes of a complex good such as housing 
services. We first describe the application of this conventional approach before 
defining the rental market extensions of Larsen and Sommervoll (2006). 
We assume that a tenant obtains utility by consuming rental housing 
services  and other goods , which gives the following equation for the tenant’s 
utility: 
 
(1)  
 
where  is the tenant’s unspecified utility function and  is a vector function 
consisting of housing features that are themselves functions of . These functions 
encompass the hedonic qualities, location, and amenities of the rental housing. 
The vector  contains tenant characteristics that allow for variations in tenant 
preferences. However, we assume that these preferences are not universally 
shared but, rather, that they are shared for pools of different types. We thus allow 
for variations of preferences across tenant types, but not within the different types. 
Furthermore, the tenant’s utility function is given by the budget constraint 
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(2)  
 
where  is the price vector of other goods,  is a vector of implicit prices for 
rental housing characteristics, and  represents tenant income. This terminology 
assumes that the vector  contains not only hedonic qualities, but also other 
characteristics with the offered rental services, such as the interactions between 
landlord and tenant. These elements all have an impact on maximizing the 
tenant’s utility. Following this methodology, we assume that the tenant can 
observe the price vector of explicit or implicit prices, , for each element and 
solve the following constrained utility maximization: 
 
(3)        such that   
 
The optimized solution for the demand of housing services  and other goods 
results in the direct utility , where * denotes the optimal solution. 
We also derive a solution for the indirect utility function  by satisfying 
the Gossen conditions: 
 
(4)    
 
where  and  are sets of elements of housing services and other goods, 
respectively. We can also write this optimization problem as , 
or . This function can be solved with respect 
to  when utility is at level . Furthermore, we use the simplification of Larsen 
and Sommervoll (2006), aggregating other goods  into a single good and letting 
 be a measured good with price  equal to one. The demand for element , is 
a function of the utility level , income , price vector , and other elements, 
denoted , conditional upon the tenant type . 
Freeman (2003) explains that tenant preferences can be mapped as tenant 
bid curves in the rent negotiation process. In accordance with general financial 
theory, these bid curves are concave, since we assume that individuals prefer more 
over less and that marginal utility is declining. These bid curves can vary across 
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different tenants and therefore outline the contour of a price function. Holding all  
other elements constant, we can write the tenant’s bid curve for quality j as  
 
(5)      
 
where the bid curve for element  is a function of the quantity of element , , 
conditional upon  for other housing services, income, utility level, and 
tenant type. 
However, the pricing of rental housing services is endogenous in a market 
consisting of both tenants and landlords. Following Freeman’s framework, these 
profit-maximizing landlords produce curves for rental housing services  using 
the quantity of element , , and the bundle price . These offer curves are 
convex and differ across landlords. We can write the offer curve for quality  as  
 
(6)  
 
where  represents the tenant’s profit level and is a vector of the landlord’s 
personal characteristics. The set contains different types of landlords, including 
small-scale individuals and large-scale businesses. However, as with the tenants, 
we assume that the landlords form a finite number of combinations of types, and 
the vector encompasses characteristics such as location of residence and scale 
of operations. 
 The equilibrium between the market price of rent and attributes of the 
different classes of housing services is then obtained from the tangencies of the 
landlord’s offer curve and the tenant’s bid curve. Together, these tangencies form 
a consistent system with agreed upon prices for elements of housing services and 
develop a common envelope function, which is the implicit price function. This 
function is frequently called the hedonic price function of rental housing services. 
 The remainder of this section introduces Larsen and Sommervoll’s (2006) 
extension of the classical framework by implementing three categories of price 
determinants for rents. These categories, however, do not affect the purchasing 
prices in the owner market. Transactions in the housing owner market typically 
occur when a bid meets or exceeds the seller’s reservation price in an auction 
process. This process is fairly uncommon in the rental market, where potential 
tenants typically consider a fixed rental price or enter into a negotiation process 
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regarding both rental terms and specific rent. It is assumed that landlords seek to 
maximize profit; however, in the rental market landlords are also exposed to risks 
such as vacancy periods, delayed payments, damage to property, and legal 
proceedings. This stimulates a selection process whereby the landlord considers 
various elements of price discrimination, which can result in rent reduction. 
Larsen and Sommervoll include these negotiation factors in the landlord’s offer 
function, 
 
(7)  
 
where  is a collection of elements that explains rent differences for otherwise 
identical dwellings,  is the vector of rental object characteristics described 
earlier, and  is a vector consisting of observed tenant characteristics such as 
marital status, number of people in the household, education, and income. The 
vector  represents additional parameters that describe the tenant–landlord 
relationship and method of initial contact. Larsen and Sommervoll argue that 
excluding these variables can lead to an omitted variable bias when explaining 
variations of rent due to the significantly different negotiation processes in the 
renter’s market compared to the owner’s market. 
 Potential tenants are also exposed to a complex optimization procedure, 
since they consider a variety of heterogeneous housing services. Tenant 
willingness to bid for rental objects can be described by the following multivariate 
equation: 
 
(8)  
 
As with the landlord’s offer function, the tenant’s bid function also includes 
landlord characteristics  and the relationship variables . Combining the 
tenant’s bid function  and the landlord’s offer function  results in the agreed 
upon monthly rent, compromised of not only the standard price determinants x, 
but also the rental specific elements included in , and . 
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4 Empirical approach 
This section presents our model and the reasoning behind its use. It also briefly 
explains the different coefficients. Our model consists of varieties of the following 
standard hedonic log–log model. The reasoning behind its use is that the log–log 
linear form is the conventional default and relatively easy to infer. Note that this 
study uses the conventional notation log in the text, when, in fact, we mean the 
natural logarithm. We use the following model: 
 
 
  
 
where the set  contains the sample population of observations, where each of the 
6,114 observations is denoted by the subscript i, and , , and  correspond to 
the sets of location, hedonic, and tenure/landlord characteristics. 
The regression includes an intercept and the location variables ; the 
hedonic variables, denoted ; and variables for tenure and landlord 
characteristics, denoted . We also present models based on interval data and 
continuous data, respectively, with the separate examinations exploring the effects 
of imputation on the interval data. 
We use the logarithm of the dependent variable and some of the 
independent variables, including monthly rent, number of square meters, tenure 
length,2
 
 and floor level. These coefficient estimates are interpreted as representing 
the price elasticity of the demand for the different continuous elements. Our 
models also include a variety of dummy variables that can be interpreted as 
markups or markdowns in rental price due to the log relation. Before discussing 
the regressions, the next section reviews the expected signs and plausible 
magnitudes based on economic intuition and earlier findings. 
                                                 2 We use the logarithm of tenure length only in the submarket models. 
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5 Expected signs and plausible magnitudes 
5.1 Location 
When exploring variations in rent based on Norway’s 19 different counties, we 
expect all coefficients to be negative, since the county Oslo is set as the default. 
We expect that price differences are heavily dependent on the county’s population 
density and that high density counties such as Akershus, Rogaland, Hordaland, 
and Sør-Trøndelag will have relatively low markdown compared to counties such 
as Finnmark, Nordland, Nord-Trøndelag, and Hedmark. Due to the lack of more 
detailed location data, we expect the model to explain smaller variations than 
Larsen and Sommervoll (2006), whose study also contained data on peripheries 
and distance to an economic focal point or city center. 
5.2 Hedonic variables  
The earlier study of Larsen and Sommervoll (2006) includes four hedonic 
variables: dwelling size, the presence of a balcony, the standard of the dwelling, 
and whether or not it is furnished. We expand the model by including the 
following variables to better explain rental prices. Dwelling size being the major 
determinant of rental price, we include a variable that allows us to interpret the 
marginal effect of increased dwelling size. Our model therefore includes both the 
natural logarithm of the number of square meters in a residence and its squared 
results,3
 With accordance with Gunterman and Norrbin (1987), the number of 
bedrooms included influences rent, but are strongly contingent on dwelling size. 
That is, an additional bedroom for a given dwelling size should result in increased 
rent as long as the dwelling is of sufficient size to accommodate a supplementary 
bedroom. To measure this effect, we construct dummy variables for the number of 
bedrooms and multiply the respective variables by the natural logarithm of size. 
Our expectation is that the supplementary bedroom increases rent, but that the 
effect decreases as the number of bedrooms increases. 
 since we do not expect the rental price to have a linear relation with 
dwelling size but, rather, to marginally decline as size increases. We expect the 
size coefficient will be positive, but that the squared size will have an offsetting 
effect, with a negative coefficient. 
                                                 3 (ln(square meters))2. 
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 Furthermore, we expand the model by including variables for the dwelling 
floor level and whether the tenant has access to an elevator, and an interaction of 
the two. Since light conditions and view are assumed to be positively correlated 
with floor levels, we expect a high floor level to have a positive impact on rent. 
We further expect that access to an elevator has a positive effect on rent and that 
the effect increases with the floor level. 
The variable for high standard is a composite variable comprising the 
scaled logarithm of the sum of affirmative responses to questions about whether 
the dwelling has tiles or electric floor heating in the bathroom, a central vacuum 
cleaner, a fireplace, parquet flooring etc. Naturally, we expect that higher 
standards increase rent. 
 Finally the variable for electricity and heating is the scaled logarithm of 
the sum of scores on responses to questions regarding included electricity and 
heating, as for the variable for high standards. However, we expect that heating is 
only important when electricity is not included, and that electricity is only 
important when heating is not included. We therefore construct our variables so 
that we can examine this hypothesis. 
5.3 Tenure and landlord characteristics 
When modeling inferences from tenure and landlord characteristics, we employ 
seven variables describing their effects on rental prices. For the tenant, we employ 
binary variables for education, income, and marital status, all of which arguably 
have a positive or negative effect on rent. From the landlord’s perspective, a 
tenant with a higher education and/or income should have a higher probability of 
meeting his or her obligation and treating the property well. This should motivate 
the landlord to discount the rent. On the other hand, tenants with a higher income 
and/or education are often able to afford larger dwellings with higher standards, 
resulting in increased rent. People with high incomes are also more likely to enter 
the owner’s market, increasing the probability of vacancy. The variable for high 
income will be computed as a dummy, with a value of one if the tenant has an 
income of 300,000 NOK or more, and zero otherwise. We expect a high degree of 
multicollinearity between education and income and therefore test for this. 
 A priori, it also not clear in what direction the variable single (that is, only 
one person who contributes with rent payments) affects rent. Singles often host 
more social gatherings than couples, which can lead to more complaints from 
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neighbors and damage to the dwelling, implying a rent premium. On the other 
hand, with only one income, singles are often also forced to live in less expensive 
dwellings than, for example, couples. Singles can, however, cause less property 
depreciation, since there is only one person to produce wear and tear on the 
dwelling, leading the landlord to prefer a single tenant. We define the variable for 
singles as a dummy that equals one if the tenant lives alone, and zero otherwise. It 
would be interesting to know the number of occupants to explore this effect more 
carefully; however, this is not specified in the data. 
 We employ variables concerning the type of landlord and the 
characteristics of their relationship to the tenant. The different classifications are 
large-scale landlords, small-scale landlords, and relatives or friends. Since we set 
small-scale landlords as the default, we expect large-scale owners to mark up their 
rents due to the diversification effect and greater market knowledge mentioned 
earlier. We use a dummy variable to control for the possibility of an omitted 
variable bias concerning large-scale landlords deriving higher rents as a result of 
using professional agents. This market mediation dummy describes whether the 
tenant found the dwelling through such channels as advertisements, newspapers, 
the Internet, or professional agents and we expect it to have a positive impact on 
rent. For landlords who are relatives or friends of tenants, we expect a markdown, 
since the landlord has a prior relationship with the tenant, which intuitively 
reduces risk. 
Regarding tenure length, Larsen and Sommervoll (2006) illustrated that, 
for example, a tenant with a one-year tenure is estimated to pay 6 percent less than 
a tenant who enters a new tenure with a similar dwelling. The authors calculated 
the natural logarithm of tenure length,4 and their conclusion is consistent with the 
theory of reduced risk associated with the revelation of tenant type. It should be 
noted that the risk reduction is probably the result of refraining from nominal 
rental adjustments and not rewriting rental contracts. The magnitude of this 
bypass is surprising, since the consumer price index, which is used as a reference 
in most rental contracts, increased by 0.4 percent in 2004 and again by 1.6 percent 
in 2005.5
                                                 4 That is, Ln(Tenure length + 1). 
 We believe that the effect of tenure length is not log-linear and we 
therefore employ dummy variables associated with the number of years a tenant 
has lived in a dwelling, with intervals of two to five years, six to 10 years, 11 to 
5 Data from Statistics Norway. 
Thesis MSc Business and Economics GRA 19002  01.09.2011 
 
15 years, and 16 to 20 years; the range of one year or less was set as the default. 
We expect the coefficients to all be negative but with different magnitudes. 
 
6 Results 
Table 6.0 summarizes our results and illustrates that the aggregate model captures 
49% of the variation in rents. The next section discusses the results.  
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Variable Interval data Continuous data Aggregate data  Coif. t-stat Coif. t-stat Coif. t-stat 
Intercept:  3.948 3.4 5.510 27.2 5.442 27.3 
Location (Oslo default):       
Akershus  -0.226 -3.4 -0.197 -11.1 -0.197 -11.5 
Aust-Agder -0.405 -3.4 -0.495 -13.2 -0.486 -13.5 
Buskerud -0.460 -5.9 -0.350 -14.8 -0.361 -15.9 
Finnmark -0.348 -3.6 -0.466 -11.5 -0.440 -11.9 
Hedmark -0.433 -5.5 -0.474 -17.3 -0.468 -18.1 
Hordaland -0.341 -6.5 -0.293 -17.1 -0.302 -18.5 
Møre og Romsdal -0.482 -7.2 -0.529 -21.0 -0.522 -22.3 
Nordland -0.455 -6.3 -0.432 -15.7 -0.436 -17.1 
Nord-Trøndelag -0.490 -4.9 -0.450 -11.9 -0.458 -13.0 
Oppland -0.479 -7.4 -0.433 -15.1 -0.452 -17.6 
Østfold -0.278 -4.1 -0.392 -17.5 -0.376 -17.7 
Rogaland -0.371 -6.5 -0.282 -14.2 -0.295 -15.8 
Sogn og Fjordane -0.510 -5.5 -0.610 -15.6 -0.591 -16.5 
Sør-Trøndelag -0.382 -6.2 -0.294 -15.2 -0.307 -16.5 
Telemark -0.463 -5.4 -0.488 -15.3 -0.481 -16.2 
Troms -0.403 -4.3 -0.388 -15.6 -0.389 -16.2 
Vest- Agder -0.419 -4.2 -0.299 -10.3 -0.312 -11.1 
Vestfold -0.301 -4.3 -0.344 -14.6 -0.337 -15.0 
Hedonic attributes (one-room 
default):       
Ln(square meters) 2.186 3.7 1.413 14.2 1.448 14.7 
(Ln(square meters))2 -0.252 -3.5 -0.158 -12.8 -0.163 -13.4 
One bedroom*ln(size) 0.018 0.9** 0.018 2.9 0.018 3.0 
Two bedroom*ln(size) 0.032 1.5** 0.038 5.5 0.037 5.6 
Three bedrooms*ln(size) 0.045 1.9* 0.063 8.2 0.061 8.3 
Four bedrooms*ln(size) 0.096 3.9 0.081 9.1 0.084 10.1 
Five bedrooms*ln(size) 0.100 3.1 0.096 8.1 0.096 8.7 
Six bedrooms*ln(size) 0.111 2.7 0.097 5.6 0.102 6.4 
Ln(Floor level) 0.087 3.8 0.058 8.1 0.063 9.2 
Elevator 0.132 1.2** 0.124 4.1 0.131 4.5 
Ln(Elevator*Floor level) 0.102 1.7* 0.062 3.7 0.069 4.3 
Balcony 0.037 1.2** 0.070 7.4 0.064 7.1 
Furnished 0.034 1.0** 0.065 5.9 0.061 5.8 
Ln(High standard) 0.071 2.4 0.106 11.2 0.103 11.4 
Characteristics (private as default):       
High income 0.051 1.3** 0.048 4.2 0.050 4.5 
Single -0.116 -3.7 -0.095 -9.4 -0.100 -10.3 
Multi-complex owner 0.150 3.7 0.097 8.7 0.103 9.6 
Relative or friend -0.096 -2.2 -0.185 -12.5 -0.171 -12.2 
Market mediation 0.152 4.7 0.136 13.9 0.142 15.3 
Tenure length 2–5 years -0.069 -1.8* -0.065 -5.7 -0.066 -6.1 
Tenure length 6–10 years -0.151 -3.2 -0.154 -10.1 -0.154 -10.6 
Tenure length 11–15 years -0.044 -0.7** -0.162 -7.3 -0.145 -7.0 
Tenure length 16–20 years -0.111 -0.9** -0.117 -3.8 -0.111 -3.7 
Adjusted R2 0.43  0.50  0.49  
Regression F-value 13.17  119.60  132.66  
RSS 73.89  473.24  553.34  
Included observations 675  4993  5668  
       
Table 6.0 Results from interval, continuous, and combined data. Here * and ** denote statistical significance 
at the 10% level and not significant, respectively. 
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6.1 Location 
The results from Table 6.0 confirm our expectations of negative coefficients when 
Oslo is set as the default. This makes sense, since the county of Oslo consists 
mainly of the city of Oslo, leading to a high population density for the whole 
region. Being the capital and main economic city in Norway, Oslo has by far the 
highest immigration rate of both foreigners and Norwegians. With limited housing 
capacity and little building construction in recent years, simple demand–supply 
theory explains much of the markup. 
 It is clear that the coefficients for the county variables are related to 
counties’ high-density cities. Examples of such counties are Hordaland, Rogaland, 
Sør-Trøndelag, and Vest-Agder. Hordaland, with the third largest coefficient, is 
the county of Bergen, the second largest city in Norway. Rogaland, the county of 
Stavanger, the fourth biggest city in Norway, also has a relatively high coefficient. 
Similar to the county of Oslo, Hordaland and Rogaland’s high coefficients may be 
partly explained by their high immigration rates. According to Statistics Norway, 
in 2009 Bergen and Stavanger were the two cities with the highest immigration 
rates after Oslo.6
6.2 Hedonic variables  
 The counties of Sør-Trøndelag and Vest-Agder have the fourth 
and fifth largest coefficients in our regression, respectively, which is consistent 
with our hypothesis since these counties houses the high-density cities Trondheim 
and Kristiansand. An exception to this relation is Akershus, a county without any 
major city but with the second highest coefficient of all the counties. This can, 
however, be explained by Akershus’ immediate proximity to the city of Oslo, 
which enables its inhabitants to commute to the capital. On the opposite side of 
the spectrum, we have the county of Sogn og Fjordane, with the lowest 
coefficient. This finding is also consistent with our hypothesis of population 
density, since the county does not contain any big cities. 
As Table 6.0 illustrates, the variables describing the objects’ characteristics have 
an essential impact when describing housing rent. All coefficients are statistically 
significant and economically important. We also observe that all coefficients have 
their expected signs. Focusing on dwelling size, our results illustrate that the 
coefficient for the natural logarithm of the number of square meters is 1,448 in the 
                                                 6 Statistics Norway, http://www.ssb.no/vis/emner/02/02/20/innvutv/main.html. 
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total sample model. The square of the same variable has a coefficient -0.163. 
These results support our theory of marginal utility from increased dwelling size, 
as illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.2 The percentage increase in monthly rent given an increase of one square meter from the base value 
(x-axis). Calculations are based on a two-bedroom apartment. 
 
Figure 6.2 indicates that, all else being equal, an increase in dwelling size from 50 
to 60 square meters is accompanied by a 3.34 percent7 increase in rent, whereas 
an increase from 60 to 70 square meters implies an increase of 1.95 percent.8
 Interestingly, our empirical results confirm the significance of a 
supplementary bedroom over the relevant size range. To illustrate, given a 
dwelling size of 80 square meters, moving from a two-bedroom to a three-
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bedroom apartment implies a monthly rent increase of 11.09 percent.9 As 
expected, the effect is decreasing: A move from four to five bedrooms for a 
dwelling of 100 square meter results in a rent increase of 5.68 percent.10
 The dwelling’s location in a building has a positive effect, rising for each 
level above the ground, with a statistically significant coefficient of 0.063. This 
implies that a move from the second to the third floor, given no access to an 
elevator, is associated with a 1.83 percent
 
11
The coefficient for access to an elevator is positive and statistically 
significant, at 0.131. More interestingly, we observe that the probability of access 
to an elevator increases with the dwelling’s floor level. According to our results, 
monthly rent increases by 3.87 percent
 increase in monthly rent. Our results 
are consistent with explanations such as improved light conditions, better view, 
and less noise when living above the ground floor. 
12 when a dwelling is located on the third 
floor with an elevator, compared to an identical dwelling located on the second 
floor. Moving from the second to the fourth floor implies a 6.97 percent13
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Our proxy for high standard illustrates a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of 0.103 in the full model. For example, a dwelling 
including a fireplace, tiles and electric floor heating in the bathroom, and parquet 
flooring in other rooms increases monthly rent by 12.85 percent14 when compared 
with a dwelling with only one of these elements. These findings are consistent 
with Larsen and Sommervoll’s results from 2006. As expected, both the variables 
Balcony and Furnished have a positive impact on rent. Our results indicate that a 
balcony increases monthly rent by 6.61 percent,15 while a furnished dwelling has 
a markup of 6.3 percent.16
When examining the effect of included electricity or heating, we find both 
variables to be not statistically significant. We also examine the relation using the 
sum of scores from the corresponding responses and find this variable to not be 
statistically significant. These findings are surprising, due to the substantial 
amount of such costs on a monthly basis. Due to the large number of right-hand 
side variables, the results are likely due to multicollinearity. 
 
We also found the effect of designated parking facilities to not be 
statistically significant. This supports our hypothesis of correlation between 
access to parking facilities and a dwelling’s decentralized location. 
6.3 Characteristics 
All of our tenant and landlord characteristic coefficients have the expected effect 
(sign) on rent and support the theory that landlord and tenant characteristics play a 
substantial role in rent variations. With private owners as the default, the results 
indicate that the anticipated effect of large-scale owners leads to higher rent. This 
is consistent with the theory that large-scale owners are less likely to institute a 
more substantial selection process. Our results indicate that large-scale owners 
                                                 
14  
      
      
15   16   
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charge a markup of 10.85 percent.17 These findings are controlled for in the 
market mediation described earlier, which has a coefficient of 0.142 in the full 
model. The market mediation coefficient indicate a markup of 15.3 percent18
 It is important to note that the market mediation effect is net of the effects 
of the tenant–landlord relationship, which we control for with the variable 
Relative or friend. The coefficient for this variable is -0.171 in the full model, 
which implies that the rent of a dwelling is 15.7 percent
 if 
the tenant found the dwelling through public channels such as the Internet, 
newspapers, and advertisements. The t-statistics show that the estimates are 
statistically significant. 
19
 Tenant characteristics are also important in rent negotiations, but, as 
mentioned, it is not always clear in what direction the variables influence the rent. 
Our results show that the variable for high education has a marginally but 
statistically insignificant negative coefficient in the full model. This can be 
interpreted as due to multicollinearity in our setup or an omitted variable bias. If 
the former, we cannot separate the education effect from, for example, object size 
and quality or from high income, which is likely to be correlated with education. 
The omitted variable effect may be as the result of variables affecting rent that are 
not observed or controlled for. The education variable is therefore excluded from 
the model. 
 lower if it is rented 
through a relative or friend, whether market mediated or not. Again, the t-statistics 
show that the estimates are statistically significant. 
 Furthermore, our results support the theory that high income leads to 
higher rent, as illustrated in our full model, with a coefficient of 0.05 indicating an 
increase in the monthly rent of 5.13 percent.20
                                                 
17  
 The t-statistics illustrate that the 
variable is statistically significant. 
 18 .  19  20   
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 The variable for singles has a negative effect on rent, with a coefficient of 
-0.1, supporting the theory that landlords reduce rent for single tenants. The result 
implies a rent reduction of 9.52 percent.21
  Finally, our results indicate that tenure length has a negative impact on 
rental prices. Our estimates provide statistically significant coefficients of tenure 
length, with -0.065 for a tenure length interval of two to five years, -0.154 for an 
interval of six to 10 years, -0.145 for 11 to 15 years, and -0.111 for 16 to 20 years. 
This indicates a discount of 6.4 percent for a tenure of between two and five years 
compared to the default of a one-year tenure. It follows that the discount is 14.3 
percent for tenures of six to 10 years, 13.5 percent for 11 to 15 years, and 10.5 
percent for 16 to 20 years. One possible explanation for the changes in discounts 
may be that the minimization of turnover and screening of good tenants lead to a 
higher discount during the initial ten years, while the discount decreases after this 
point as the landlord realizes the tenant has grown into the living unit and is thus 
less likely to move. 
 
6.4 Parameter stability testing 
The regression results embody the implicit assumption that parameters are 
constant for both the data collected between October 2009 and February 2010 and 
any subsequent period used for modeling rent variations in Norway. We test this 
assumption using the Chow test for parameter stability, with the null hypothesis 
 
 and   
 
We utilize the same data used to estimate our previous regressions and include 
data collected in the period October 2005 to February 2006 from the previous 
Norwegian rental survey from 2006.22 Variables are constructed in the same 
manner as the data from 2010, when possible.23
                                                 
21  
 The 2006 survey results have 
location variables on a regional level instead of the county level. We therefore 
construct a dummy variable for Oslo and Akershus, with other regions set as the 
default, to deal with the substantial rent premium associated with these regions. 
22 Only observations containing the exact size of the dwelling in square meters were included in the parameter stability test. 23 Monthly rental prices were adjusted for inflation:   
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The absence of information regarding access to an elevator and the non-
continuous coding of floor levels made us exclude these variables. The test 
statistic was obtained through the equation: 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
Comparing the test statistic with the critical value at the 5 percent level, we 
conclude that coefficients are not statistically equal in the two periods24
6.5 Rental submarkets 
; that is, 
the hypothesis of parameter stability through the different periods is rejected. 
The Norwegian rental market consists of several submarkets. Our model estimates 
an aggregate hedonic rent model with the data containing different property types 
and regions. This may violate the basic assumption of the linear regression model, 
since the structural parameters that generate rent are not necessarily identical for 
different property types or regions, see Allen et al. (1973) for further details. The 
parameter estimates provided by ordinary least squares regression and the 
inferences drawn from them can therefore be inaccurate. This study acknowledges 
that tenants limit their choices of dwellings by property type and location, 
therefore only operating in specific submarkets, which results in a distinct 
function for each submarket. 
The next section determines whether implicit rental prices differ across 
different property types and whether any regional differences exist. We estimate 
an ordinary least squares model for each submarket, as we did in the full model. 
Due to the lack of sufficient data, we reduce our model by transforming our 
geographic variables into a dummy variable for Oslo. We also remove variables 
concerning number of bedrooms, and the constructed dummy variables for tenure 
                                                 24 Here . 
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length as these variables were found insignificant in all submarket models. The 
statistical significance and relative sizes of the coefficients vary significantly 
across submarket models, confirming the presence of rental submarkets. 
 
Property types 
We apply our model to three different property types, with the empirical estimates 
illustrated in Table 6.5.a. All three models vary according to their explanatory 
power and in terms of the significance and magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients. 
 
Variable Studio  Apartments  Houses 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept: 7.115 72.8 7.098 95.2 7.987 53.2 
       
Location       
Dummy Oslo 0.228 10.3 0.302 24.5 0.270 7.1 
       
Hedonic variables:       
Ln (square meters) 0.321 14.3 0.356 20.7 0.107 3.3 
Ln (Floor level) 0.065 4.0 0.033 4.0 N/A N/A 
Elevator 0.217 1.9 0.066 2.2 N/A N/A 
Ln (Elevator*Floor level) 0.164 3.0 0.021 1.3 N/A N/A 
Balcony 0.022 1.1 0.054 4.5 0.051 1.8* 
Ln (High standard) 0.108 5.3 0.094 7.6 0.174 6.8 
Furnished 0.049 2.5 0.116 8.1 0.093 3.0 
       
Characteristics 
(private landlord as default):       
High income 0.037 1.4 0.056 3.7 0.073 2.4 
Single -0.124 -6.3 -0.128 -9.8 -0.192 -7.0 
Multi-complex owner 0.167 5.4 0.079 6.3 0.161 3.4 
Relative or friend -0.153 -5.3 -0.187 -8.2 -0.084 -2.5 
Market mediation 0.094 4.8 0.127 10.0 0.251 9.1 
Ln (Tenure length) -0.078 -4.6 -0.085 -8.1 -0.11 5.2 
       
Adjusted R2 0.406  0.489  0.348  
Regression F-value 49.800  184.4  46.5  
Included observations 1036  2715  936  
 
Table 6.5.a Comparison of different property types. Here * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
The sub models have relatively good explanatory powers: The apartment model 
explains as much as 48.9 percent, followed by 40.6 percent for the studio model 
and 34.8 for the house model. As expected, all the submarkets have a markup for 
Oslo. Apartments have the highest markup, followed by houses and studios. 
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Students, who all have approximately the same economic premises, with student 
funding and possibly a part-time job, often rent studios. This phenomenon could 
set a ceiling on rent development for this property type, independent of city, as 
long as universities are present. 
For all submarkets, dwelling size is significant and its coefficient 
illustrates that the size variable has the highest effect on rent. Floor level is also 
significant for studios and apartments and has a positive effect on rent.  
Access to an elevator also has a positive effect on rent in both submarkets. 
The results for the studio market, however, are only significant at the 10 percent 
level. The additional effect from floor levels, given access to an elevator, is 
significant and contributes positively to rent for the studio market. For the 
apartment market, the effect is not significant.   
The balcony variable has a positive effect on rent in all submarkets but is 
not significant for the studio model. A plausible explanation for this is that studios 
seldom have a balcony.  
Our proxy for high standards is statistically significant for all three 
submarkets, with the coefficient for houses providing the highest markup, 
followed by those for studios and apartments. The difference between the 
different property types is, however, relatively small. The variable for furnished 
dwellings is significant in all submarkets and indicates that these units command a 
higher rent. The coefficients are, however, relatively small compared to furnishing 
costs, providing no incentive for landlords to furnish dwellings. 
 The effect of a high income, although not significant in the studio market, 
has a positive effect on rent in all submarkets. This is supported by the fact that 
individuals with high income seldom rent studios. 
 Being a single person has, as in the full model, a negative effect on rent in 
all submarkets. The effect is stronger for certain property types, being highest in 
the house market and lowest in the studio market. Our result is logical, since most 
singles live in either a studio or an apartment, both because they do not need the 
extra space and to avoid the extra expenses associated with renting a house. 
 As in the full model, our results show that the effects of multi-complex 
owners lead to higher rent in all submarkets. The result for the house market is not 
significant, which is not surprising, since the portfolios of multi-complex owners 
often consist of mostly apartments and studios. As in the full model, these results 
control for market mediation. The market mediation coefficients are significant in 
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all submarkets and indicate a markup if the tenant found the dwelling through 
public channels. Our results indicate that the effect from market mediation is more 
than twice as large in the house market as in the studio market. Government and 
academic institutions dominate the market for studio housing. Multi-complex 
landlords typically price-discriminate according to certain criteria, such as against 
students or individuals on welfare. 
 Our results for the variable for being a relative or friend are consistent with 
those from the full model, with a rental discount in each submarket, whether 
market mediated or not. This result is significant in all three submarkets. 
Finally, our results illustrate that tenure length has a negative impact on 
rental prices in all submarkets. Again, all the t-statistics are significant and the 
results are consistent with previous studies. 
A factor we were not able to develop proxies for, and that intuitively may 
be valuable for the house segment, is the value of privacy. However, the lack of 
suitable variables covering this issue prevents us from examining this aspect 
further. 
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Regional differences 
This section analyzes the different rent determinants at the regional level. We 
expect that market makers do not set the rental price the same way in all parts of 
Norway and that different regions can have non-observable regularities. 
 
Variable Oslo Hordaland Sør Trøndelag Rogaland 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept: 7.083 89.4 7.418 42.1 7.315 31.5 7.144 31.9 
         
Hedonic variables:         
Ln (square meters) 0.444 24.0 0.264 7.0 0.241 4.8 0.288 5.9 
Ln (Floor level) 
0.021 2.3 0.140 4.8 0.191 5.5 0.117 2.8 
Elevator 
0.063 1.9 0.661 2.0 0.398 2.4 -0.350 -0.7 
Ln (Elevator* Floor 
level) 
0.036 2.0 0.299 1.9 0.183 2.2 -0.199 -0.7 
Balcony 
0.061 4.0 0.029 1.0 0.068 1.8 0.070 1.7 
Ln (High standard) 
0.081 4.9 0.095 3.1 0.171 4.4 0.216 5.5 
Furnished 0.052 3.1 0.083 2.7 0.071 1.6 0.120 2.9 
         
Characteristics 
(private landlord as 
default):         
High income 0.061 3.2 0.079 2.1 -0.036 -0.7 0.050 1.1 
Single -0.115 -6.7 -0.183 -5.7 -0.109 -2.6 -0.071 -1.8 
Multi-complex 
owner 
0.082 5.1 0.132 3.9 0.237 4.5 0.208 3.3 
Relative or friend -0.209 -7.4 -0.185 -3.9 -0.204 -3.5 -0.079 -1.4 
Market mediation 0.140 8.7 0.149 4.9 0.131 3.3 0.125 3.0 
Ln (Tenure length) -0.087 -6.6 -0.136 -5.4 -0.122 -3.6 -0.118 -3.4 
         
Adjusted R2 0.49  0.43  0.40  0.40  
Regression F-value 124.26  29.32  17.97  18.37  
Included 
observations 
1 671  529  365  378  
 
Table 6.5.b Comparison of different regions. 
 
Table 6.5.b shows that all models are statistically significant, but only the 
coefficients for size in square meters, the proxy for standards, being single, having 
a multi-complex owner, market mediation, and tenure length are significant in all 
regional models. Our overall results are surprising due to our anticipation of price 
complexity in Oslo: With the exception of size, the existence of a balcony, and a 
small deviation from the effect of having a relative or friend as a landlord, the 
remaining coefficients imply a lesser influence in the Oslo model compared with 
Thesis MSc Business and Economics GRA 19002  01.09.2011 
 
other regions. However, the results may be influenced by the large effect from the 
size coefficient or effects not captured by the model. The relatively small number 
of observations in some regions can also bias our results. 
 For all the regional models, larger dwellings imply higher rent. However, 
the size of the coefficients varies across models and is, as mentioned, more 
pronounced in the Oslo model. This high degree of variation indicates high 
parameter sensitivity. 
 We further observe that the rent increases with each floor above the 
ground. The coefficient for this variable varies from 0.191 in the Sør-Trøndelag 
model to 0.021 in the Oslo model, compared with the aggregate model, where the 
coefficient has a magnitude of 0.063. This finding can be interpreted as the price 
elasticity of higher floor levels being greater for Sør-Trøndelag than for the 
overall market. However, it should be noted that the aggregate model also 
includes variables excluded from the regional models. 
 Access to an elevator is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for 
the Sør-Trøndelag and Hordaland models, while a higher floor level, given access 
to an elevator, is significant in the Oslo and Sør-Trøndelag models. The effect 
from the interaction coefficient between the floor level and elevator access varies 
from 0.036 in the Oslo model to 0.183 in the Sør-Trøndelag model. These 
findings indicate that access to an elevator when the dwelling is on the fourth 
floor has a greater effect in Sør-Trøndelag than in Oslo. 
 The presence of a balcony is only statistically significant in the Oslo 
model and leads to a rental markup of 6.2 percent. The coefficient for furnished 
dwellings and the proxy for standards seem fairly stable throughout the models, 
with parameters in the range 0.051 to 0.083. It should be noted that the coefficient 
for furnished dwellings is not statistically significant in the Sør-Trøndelag model. 
 Variables concerning the tenant’s income and relationship status have the 
expected signs in all models. However, high income is only statistically 
significant in the Oslo and Hordaland models, while being single leads to a 
statistically significant markdown in all models except Rogaland. 
 Adjusted for market mediation, markups for multi-complex landlords are 
in the range 0.08 to 0.23, and we note that having a friend or relative as a landlord 
leads to a markdown in all models except for Rogaland’s, where the coefficient is 
not statistically significant. 
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 Focusing on tenure length, we observe that while the effect of length of 
residence is fairly stable at 0.12–0.13 in the three models, the coefficient for Oslo 
is only 0.08. This finding is supported by the significant demand for housing 
services in Oslo, allowing landlords there to gradually adjust prices more so than 
in other regions. However, as mentioned, the coefficients seem rather high 
compared with the overall price index. 
 
7 Summary and conclusions 
Using data from the national rental survey of Statistics Norway, we conduct a 
thorough analysis of the Norwegian rental market, including substantial attributes 
and characteristics and their respective impact on monthly rental prices. Our 
analysis applies the standard hedonic log–log framework introduced by Freeman 
(2003), with the extensions of tenant and landlord characteristics contributed by 
Larsen and Sommervoll (2006) and our own additions. We find that geographic 
variables, hedonic qualities, and tenant–landlord characteristics explain 49 percent 
of variations in monthly rent. Our tests of parameter stability for the aggregate 
model demonstrate the inequality of parameters for different periods. 
 Although earlier studies have made significant contributions in explaining 
residential rent in Norway, our study further acknowledges that tenants limit their 
choices of housing services by property type and location, thereby operating in 
particular submarkets. The statistical significance and relative sizes of the variable 
coefficients vary significantly across property types, confirming the presence of 
rental submarkets. We also confirm that market makers do not set rental prices the 
same way in all parts of Norway and that different regions may have other non-
observable irregularities. 
 Our analysis reveals that rent increases tend to be a function of population 
density. We find that counties with high population densities and immigration 
rates have significant rental markups compared to other regions, and with the 
limited building construction in recent years, simple demand–supply theory can 
explain much of these increases. We further support the theory of marginal rent 
contribution as a function of not only size but also the number of bedrooms: A 
supplementary bedroom implies a rent increase as long as the dwelling is of 
sufficient size. 
 A compelling finding concerning the hedonic qualities is the estimated 
effect of floor levels, given access to an elevator. Willingness to pay a premium 
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for living on a high floor can be estimated as a function of floor level, given 
access to an elevator. This effect varies and is statistically significant in three out 
of four examined regions in Norway. 
 Our tenant and landlord characteristics have a substantial impact on 
variations in rent. The findings are consistent with the theory that small-scale 
landlords are likely to institute a more critical selection process, favoring desirable 
tenants and leading to rental discounts. 
 The analysis of tenure length is also consistent with earlier studies on the 
Norwegian rental market, indicating the likelihood of a discount compared to 
entering a new contract of a similar dwelling. A proven track record can therefore 
be viewed as a sign of reduced risk, motivating landlords to lower their rent. 
  
Thesis MSc Business and Economics GRA 19002  01.09.2011 
 
References 
 
Allen et al. 1973. Pricing across residential rental submarkets. Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics 11(2), 137–151. 
 
 
Freeman, A. M. 2003. The measurement of environmental and resource values: Theory 
and methods. Resources for the Future (Book). 
 
Goodman, A. C. 1978. Hedonic prices, price indices and housing markets. Journal of 
Urban Economics 5, 471–484. 
 
Gunterman, Karl L. and Stefan Norrbin. 1987. Explaining the variability of apartment 
rents. AREUEA Journal 15(4), 321–340. 
 
Hanushek, E. A. and J. M. Quigley. 1980. What is the price elasticity of housing 
demand? Review of Economics and Statistics 62(2), August. 
 
Ihlanfeldt, K. R. 1981. An empirical investigation of alternative approaches to 
estimating the equilibrium demand for housing. Journal of Urban Economics 9(1), 97–
105. 
 
Jaffe, A. J and R. G. Bussa. 1975. Using a simple model to estimate market rents: A 
case study. Appraisal Journal 45, 7–13. 
 
Jaffe, A. J., and R. G. Bussa. 1977. Using a simple model to estimate market rents: A 
case study. Appraisal Journal (January–February), 7-B. 
 
Lancaster, K. J. 1966. A new approach to consumer theory. Journal of Political 
Economy 74(2). 
 
Larsen, E. R., and D. E. Sommervoll. 2006. The impact on rent from tenant and 
landlord characteristics and interaction. Discussion Paper No. 467, August, Statistics 
Norway, Research Department. 
 
Larsen, E. R., and D. E. Sommervoll. 2009. The impact on rent from tenant and 
landlord characteristics and interaction. Regional Science and Urban Economics 39, 
316–322. 
 
Lowery, Ira S. 1981. Rental housing in the 1970’s: Searching for the crisis. In Rental 
Housing: Is There a Crisis? John C. Weather (ed.), Urban Institute Press, Washington 
D.C. 
 
Marshall, D. W. 1990. The influence of property characteristics on rents. Working 
paper. 
 
Marshall, Robert C., and J. Louis Guasch. 1983. Occupancy discounts in the U.S. rental 
housing market. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 45(Nov.), 357–378. 
 
Merrill, Sally R. 1977. Draft Report on Hedonic Indices as Measure of Housing 
Quality. Bat Associates, Cambridge, MA. 
Thesis MSc Business and Economics GRA 19002  01.09.2011 
 
 
Ogur, J. D. 1973. Higher education and housing. American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology 32(4), 387–394. 
 
Prave, R. S., and J. K. Ord. 1987. An evaluation of apartment preferences using 
conjoint analysis. Working paper, Division Management Science, Pennsylvania State 
University. 
 
Schnare, A. B., and R. J. Struyk. 1976. Segmentation in urban housing markets. Journal 
of Urban Economics 2(2), 146–166. 
 
Rosen, Sherwin. 1974. Hedonic prices and implicit markets: Product differentiation in 
pure competition. Journal of Political Economy 82(1), 34–55. 
 
Sirmans, Sirmans, and John D. Benjamin. 1989. Determining apartment rent: The value 
of amenities, services, and external factors. Journal of Real Estate Research 4(2), 33–
44. 
 
Sirmans, Sirmans, and John D. Benjamin. 1990. Examining the variability of apartment 
rent. Real Estate Appraiser and Analyst 56(2), 43–88. 
 
Smith, C. A., and M. J. Kroll. 1988. Improving estimates of potential gross income in 
multi-family properties through market research. Appraisal Journal 55(1), 118–125. 
 
 
Smith, H. C., and Jerry D. Belloit. 1987. Multiple linear regressions for appraisal. In 
Real Estate Appraisal, 2nd edition. Century VII Publishing Company, Beavercreek, 
OH. 
 
Sonstelie, J. C., and P. R. Portney. 1980. Gross rents and market values: Testing the 
implications of Tiebout`s hypothesis. Journal of Urban Economics 7(1), 102–118. 
 
Sriman, G. S. and John D. Benjamin. 1991. Determinants of market rent. Journal of 
Real Estate Research 6, 357–379. 
 
Straszheim, M. R. 1973. Estimation of the demand for urban housing services from 
household interview data. Review of Economics and Statistics 55(55).  
 
Barker, D., 2003. Length of residence discounts, turnover, and demand elasticity:   
should long-term tenants pay less than new tenants? Journal of Housing 
Economics 12 (1), 1–11. 
 
Goodman, A.C., Kawai, D., 1985. Length-of-residence discounts and rental 
housing demand: theory and evidence. Land Economics 61 (2), 93–105. 
 
 
  
Thesis MSc Business and Economics GRA 19002  01.09.2011 
 
Appendix 
2.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Intervall data: 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance 
rent 777 1000.00 25000.00 5743.7619 2936.75727 8624543.282 
countyOslo 777 .00 1.00 .2085 .40649 .165 
countyAkers 777 .00 1.00 .0579 .23373 .055 
countyAusta 777 .00 1.00 .0129 .11279 .013 
countyBuske 777 .00 1.00 .0360 .18650 .035 
countyFinnm 777 .00 1.00 .0219 .14638 .021 
countyHedm 777 .00 1.00 .0373 .18967 .036 
countyHorda 777 .00 1.00 .1017 .30241 .091 
countyMorerom 777 .00 1.00 .0489 .21581 .047 
countyNordlan 777 .00 1.00 .0438 .20469 .042 
countyNordtron 777 .00 1.00 .0193 .13768 .019 
countyOppl 777 .00 1.00 .0592 .23615 .056 
countyOstf 777 .00 1.00 .0515 .22112 .049 
countyRogal 777 .00 1.00 .0862 .28088 .079 
countySognog 777 .00 1.00 .0219 .14638 .021 
countySorTron 777 .00 1.00 .0656 .24781 .061 
countyTelem 777 .00 1.00 .0322 .17658 .031 
countyTromsr 777 .00 1.00 .0232 .15053 .023 
countyVesta 777 .00 1.00 .0245 .15455 .024 
countyVestf 777 .00 1.00 .0476 .21310 .045 
sumkvm 777 25.00 130.00 72.6126 29.27048 856.761 
soverom0 777 .00 1.00 .0425 .20179 .041 
soverom1 777 .00 1.00 .3977 .48973 .240 
soverom2 777 .00 1.00 .3166 .46545 .217 
soverom3 777 .00 1.00 .1519 .35912 .129 
soverom4 777 .00 1.00 .0695 .25446 .065 
soverom5 777 .00 1.00 .0154 .12339 .015 
soverom6 777 .00 1.00 .0064 .08001 .006 
etasje 767 .00 15.00 2.3468 2.38734 5.699 
Heismiss 777 .00 1.00 .0631 .24323 .059 
Balkongegen 757 .00 1.00 .6301 .48309 .233 
heldelmobl 762 .00 1.00 .2651 .44167 .195 
lnhighstd 726 .00 1.61 .7749 .49458 .245 
incomehigh 748 .00 1.00 .1430 .35036 .123 
single 772 .00 1.00 .5440 .49838 .248 
llprivate 753 .00 1.00 .4409 .49683 .247 
llmulticomp 777 .00 1.00 .1493 .35661 .127 
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llrelfriend 777 .00 1.00 .1158 .32023 .103 
mmediation 777 .00 1.00 .2806 .44957 .202 
tlength1 777 .00 1.00 .1943 .39594 .157 
tlength25 775 .00 1.00 .5497 .49785 .248 
tlength610 775 .00 1.00 .1742 .37952 .144 
tlength1115 775 .00 1.00 .0671 .25035 .063 
tlength1620 775 .00 1.00 .0168 .12851 .017 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
663      
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Continuous data: 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance 
rent 5315 1000.00 25000.00 6527.5308 3007.99745 9048048.639 
countyOstf 5315 .00 1.00 .0476 .21294 .045 
countyAkers 5315 .00 1.00 .0837 .27700 .077 
countyOslo 5315 .00 1.00 .3052 .46052 .212 
countyHedm 5315 .00 1.00 .0294 .16880 .028 
countyOppl 5315 .00 1.00 .0269 .16182 .026 
countyBuske 5315 .00 1.00 .0410 .19835 .039 
countyVestf 5315 .00 1.00 .0414 .19921 .040 
countyTelem 5315 .00 1.00 .0214 .14489 .021 
countyAusta 5315 .00 1.00 .0143 .11873 .014 
countyVesta 5315 .00 1.00 .0263 .16016 .026 
countyRogal 5315 .00 1.00 .0662 .24870 .062 
countyHorda 5315 .00 1.00 .0926 .28985 .084 
countySognog 5315 .00 1.00 .0132 .11401 .013 
countyMorerom 5315 .00 1.00 .0363 .18708 .035 
countySorTron 5315 .00 1.00 .0643 .24539 .060 
countyNordtron 5315 .00 1.00 .0141 .11796 .014 
countyNordlan 5315 .00 1.00 .0286 .16669 .028 
countyTromsr 5315 .00 1.00 .0352 .18426 .034 
countyFinnm 5315 .00 1.00 .0122 .10992 .012 
sumkvm 5315 10.00 300.00 72.2864 36.70024 1346.908 
soverom0 5315 .00 1.00 .0452 .20766 .043 
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soverom1 5315 .00 1.00 .4472 .49725 .247 
soverom2 5315 .00 1.00 .3161 .46499 .216 
soverom3 5315 .00 1.00 .1355 .34225 .117 
soverom4 5315 .00 1.00 .0427 .20222 .041 
soverom5 5315 .00 1.00 .0102 .10029 .010 
soverom6 5315 .00 1.00 .0032 .05647 .003 
etasje 5272 .00 20.00 2.8003 2.61588 6.843 
Heismiss 5315 .00 1.00 .0944 .29248 .086 
heldelmobl 5279 .00 1.00 .2453 .43031 .185 
lnhighstd 5209 .00 1.61 .8953 .49485 .245 
incomehigh 5164 .00 1.00 .1931 .39474 .156 
single 5310 .00 1.00 .4401 .49645 .246 
llprivate 5263 .00 1.00 .4515 .49768 .248 
llmulticomp 5315 .00 1.00 .2190 .41361 .171 
llrelfriend 5315 .00 1.00 .1138 .31763 .101 
mmediation 5315 .00 1.00 .4218 .49390 .244 
tlength1 938 .00 1.00 .0139 .11697 .014 
tlength25 5302 .00 1.00 .5511 .49743 .247 
tlength610 5302 .00 1.00 .1486 .35575 .127 
tlength1115 5302 .00 1.00 .0517 .22140 .049 
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tlength1620 5302 .00 1.00 .0240 .15292 .023 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
868      
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Aggregate data: 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance 
rent 6092 1000.00 25000.00 6427.5655 3010.14550 9060975.950 
countyOstf 6092 .00 1.00 .0481 .21399 .046 
countyAkers 6092 .00 1.00 .0804 .27199 .074 
countyOslo 6092 .00 1.00 .2928 .45510 .207 
countyHedm 6092 .00 1.00 .0304 .17161 .029 
countyOppl 6092 .00 1.00 .0310 .17340 .030 
countyBuske 6092 .00 1.00 .0404 .19687 .039 
countyVestf 6092 .00 1.00 .0422 .20103 .040 
countyTelem 6092 .00 1.00 .0228 .14933 .022 
countyAusta 6092 .00 1.00 .0141 .11798 .014 
countyVesta 6092 .00 1.00 .0261 .15945 .025 
countyRogal 6092 .00 1.00 .0688 .25310 .064 
countyHorda 6092 .00 1.00 .0937 .29148 .085 
countySognog 6092 .00 1.00 .0143 .11866 .014 
countyMorerom 6092 .00 1.00 .0379 .19102 .036 
countySorTron 6092 .00 1.00 .0645 .24568 .060 
countyNordtron 6092 .00 1.00 .0148 .12065 .015 
countyNordlan 6092 .00 1.00 .0305 .17206 .030 
countyTromsr 6092 .00 1.00 .0337 .18034 .033 
countyFinnm 6092 .00 1.00 .0135 .11524 .013 
sumkvm 6092 10.00 300.00 72.3280 35.83648 1284.253 
soverom0 6092 .00 1.00 .0448 .20691 .043 
soverom1 6092 .00 1.00 .4409 .49654 .247 
soverom2 6092 .00 1.00 .3162 .46501 .216 
soverom3 6092 .00 1.00 .1376 .34446 .119 
soverom4 6092 .00 1.00 .0461 .20978 .044 
soverom5 6092 .00 1.00 .0108 .10353 .011 
soverom6 6092 .00 1.00 .0036 .05999 .004 
etasje 6039 .00 20.00 2.7427 2.59219 6.719 
Heismiss 6092 .00 1.00 .0904 .28684 .082 
Balkongegen 6023 .00 1.00 .5954 .49086 .241 
heldelmobl 6041 .00 1.00 .2478 .43177 .186 
lnhighstd 5935 .00 1.61 .8806 .49634 .246 
incomehigh 5912 .00 1.00 .1867 .38973 .152 
single 6082 .00 1.00 .4533 .49786 .248 
llprivate 6016 .00 1.00 .4501 .49755 .248 
llmulticomp 6092 .00 1.00 .2101 .40742 .166 
llrelfriend 6092 .00 1.00 .1141 .31794 .101 
mmediation 6092 .00 1.00 .4038 .49070 .241 
tlength1 1096 .00 1.00 .0137 .11624 .014 
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tlength25 6077 .00 1.00 .5509 .49744 .247 
tlength610 6077 .00 1.00 .1519 .35894 .129 
tlength1115 6077 .00 1.00 .0536 .22533 .051 
tlength1620 6077 .00 1.00 .0230 .15004 .023 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
1003      
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6.0 Results  
Aggregate data: 
Dependent Variable: LOGRENT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/24/11   Time: 14:37   
Sample (adjusted): 1 6085   
Included observations: 5668 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 5.441519 0.199480 27.27850 0.0000 
COUNTYAKERS -0.197059 0.017181 -11.46951 0.0000 
COUNTYAUSTA -0.485512 0.035931 -13.51222 0.0000 
COUNTYBUSKE -0.360877 0.022676 -15.91459 0.0000 
COUNTYFINNM -0.440109 0.037131 -11.85272 0.0000 
COUNTYHEDM -0.467812 0.025906 -18.05776 0.0000 
COUNTYHORDA -0.301837 0.016282 -18.53852 0.0000 
COUNTYMOREROM -0.522253 0.023434 -22.28606 0.0000 
COUNTYNORDLAN -0.436460 0.025573 -17.06729 0.0000 
COUNTYNORDTRON -0.458397 0.035246 -13.00561 0.0000 
COUNTYOPPL -0.451642 0.025645 -17.61096 0.0000 
COUNTYOSTF -0.376051 0.021195 -17.74248 0.0000 
COUNTYROGAL -0.294571 0.018698 -15.75384 0.0000 
COUNTYSOGNOG -0.591143 0.035799 -16.51298 0.0000 
COUNTYSORTRON -0.306630 0.018569 -16.51336 0.0000 
COUNTYTELEM -0.481499 0.029800 -16.15785 0.0000 
COUNTYTROMSR -0.389290 0.024081 -16.16577 0.0000 
COUNTYVESTA -0.311689 0.028055 -11.10994 0.0000 
COUNTYVESTF -0.336505 0.022425 -15.00563 0.0000 
LOGKVM 1.448133 0.098333 14.72689 0.0000 
LOGKVMSQ -0.162903 0.012124 -13.43693 0.0000 
SOVEROM1*LOGKVM 0.018316 0.006081 3.012096 0.0026 
SOVEROM2*LOGKVM 0.037436 0.006627 5.648851 0.0000 
SOVEROM3*LOGKVM 0.060595 0.007260 8.345818 0.0000 
SOVEROM4*LOGKVM 0.083647 0.008268 10.11700 0.0000 
SOVEROM5*LOGKVM 0.096426 0.011082 8.701280 0.0000 
SOVEROM6*LOGKVM 0.101598 0.015849 6.410237 0.0000 
LNETASJE 0.062796 0.006831 9.192230 0.0000 
HEISMISS 0.131016 0.029397 4.456721 0.0000 
LNETASJEHEIS 0.068836 0.016139 4.265222 0.0000 
BALKONGEGEN 0.064496 0.009100 7.087699 0.0000 
HELDELMOBL 0.060609 0.010412 5.820979 0.0000 
LNHIGHSTD 0.102665 0.009014 11.38915 0.0000 
INCOMEHIGH 0.049830 0.010984 4.536590 0.0000 
SINGLE -0.099762 0.009656 -10.33108 0.0000 
LLMULTICOMP 0.102971 0.010760 9.569835 0.0000 
LLRELFRIEND -0.171256 0.014049 -12.18999 0.0000 
MMEDIATION 0.141961 0.009293 15.27539 0.0000 
TLENGTH25 -0.066087 0.010885 -6.071457 0.0000 
TLENGTH610 -0.153851 0.014555 -10.57053 0.0000 
TLENGTH1115 -0.145396 0.020652 -7.040294 0.0000 
TLENGTH1620 -0.111032 0.030157 -3.681786 0.0002 
     
     R-squared 0.491561    Mean dependent var 8.672763 
Adjusted R-squared 0.487856    S.D. dependent var 0.438229 
S.E. of regression 0.313615    Akaike info criterion 0.526082 
Sum squared resid 553.3421    Schwarz criterion 0.575304 
Log likelihood -1448.916    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.543224 
F-statistic 132.6643    Durbin-Watson stat 1.867045 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Continuous data: 
 
Dependent Variable: LOGRENT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/24/11   Time: 14:50   
Sample: 1 5315    
Included observations: 4993   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 5.509703 0.202218 27.24634 0.0000 
COUNTYAKERS -0.196609 0.017704 -11.10518 0.0000 
COUNTYAUSTA -0.495243 0.037532 -13.19507 0.0000 
COUNTYBUSKE -0.350187 0.023644 -14.81054 0.0000 
COUNTYFINNM -0.465849 0.040581 -11.47962 0.0000 
COUNTYHEDM -0.474457 0.027455 -17.28141 0.0000 
COUNTYHORDA -0.292509 0.017144 -17.06144 0.0000 
COUNTYMOREROM -0.528723 0.025164 -21.01149 0.0000 
COUNTYNORDLAN -0.432056 0.027529 -15.69456 0.0000 
COUNTYNORDTRON -0.449803 0.037806 -11.89754 0.0000 
COUNTYOPPL -0.433290 0.028655 -15.12079 0.0000 
COUNTYOSTF -0.392134 0.022367 -17.53146 0.0000 
COUNTYROGAL -0.282089 0.019895 -14.17920 0.0000 
COUNTYSOGNOG -0.610150 0.039189 -15.56934 0.0000 
COUNTYSORTRON -0.294447 0.019428 -15.15608 0.0000 
COUNTYTELEM -0.488318 0.031909 -15.30338 0.0000 
COUNTYTROMSR -0.387697 0.024818 -15.62187 0.0000 
COUNTYVESTA -0.298746 0.029115 -10.26091 0.0000 
COUNTYVESTF -0.344367 0.023647 -14.56253 0.0000 
LOGKVM 1.413448 0.099766 14.16766 0.0000 
LOGKVMSQ -0.158443 0.012344 -12.83550 0.0000 
SOVEROM1*LOGKVM 0.018399 0.006376 2.885513 0.0039 
SOVEROM2*LOGKVM 0.038263 0.006973 5.486951 0.0000 
SOVEROM3*LOGKVM 0.063133 0.007665 8.236901 0.0000 
SOVEROM4*LOGKVM 0.080769 0.008869 9.106523 0.0000 
SOVEROM5*LOGKVM 0.096110 0.011856 8.106323 0.0000 
SOVEROM6*LOGKVM 0.096753 0.017426 5.552294 0.0000 
LNETASJE 0.057777 0.007174 8.053146 0.0000 
HEISMISS 0.123775 0.030492 4.059300 0.0000 
LNETASJEHEIS 0.062366 0.016690 3.736727 0.0002 
BALKONGEGEN 0.070254 0.009517 7.381798 0.0000 
HELDELMOBL 0.064673 0.010982 5.889102 0.0000 
LNHIGHSTD 0.106474 0.009480 11.23172 0.0000 
INCOMEHIGH 0.048008 0.011436 4.197903 0.0000 
SINGLE -0.095296 0.010160 -9.379522 0.0000 
LLMULTICOMP 0.096617 0.011131 8.679882 0.0000 
LLRELFRIEND -0.185483 0.014886 -12.46026 0.0000 
MMEDIATION 0.135540 0.009738 13.91847 0.0000 
TLENGTH25 -0.064876 0.011342 -5.720181 0.0000 
TLENGTH610 -0.154381 0.015298 -10.09160 0.0000 
TLENGTH1115 -0.161646 0.022019 -7.341361 0.0000 
TLENGTH1620 -0.116547 0.030970 -3.763224 0.0002 
     
     R-squared 0.497601    Mean dependent var 8.687769 
Adjusted R-squared 0.493441    S.D. dependent var 0.434387 
S.E. of regression 0.309166    Akaike info criterion 0.498502 
Sum squared resid 473.2356    Schwarz criterion 0.553311 
Log likelihood -1202.510    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.517713 
F-statistic 119.6028    Durbin-Watson stat 1.875548 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Intervall data: 
 
Dependent Variable: LOGRENT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/24/11   Time: 14:55   
Sample (adjusted): 3 776   
Included observations: 675 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 3.948457 1.173301 3.365254 0.0008 
COUNTYAKERS -0.225569 0.065769 -3.429715 0.0006 
COUNTYAUSTA -0.404684 0.120288 -3.364300 0.0008 
COUNTYBUSKE -0.459703 0.077703 -5.916189 0.0000 
COUNTYFINNM -0.347519 0.097052 -3.580758 0.0004 
COUNTYHEDM -0.433153 0.078733 -5.501555 0.0000 
COUNTYHORDA -0.341256 0.052390 -6.513791 0.0000 
COUNTYMOREROM -0.482247 0.066787 -7.220669 0.0000 
COUNTYNORDLAN -0.455457 0.072108 -6.316362 0.0000 
COUNTYNORDTRON -0.490143 0.100774 -4.863798 0.0000 
COUNTYOPPL -0.478819 0.064510 -7.422420 0.0000 
COUNTYOSTF -0.277748 0.067903 -4.090350 0.0000 
COUNTYROGAL -0.371004 0.056743 -6.538302 0.0000 
COUNTYSOGNOG -0.509863 0.092557 -5.508658 0.0000 
COUNTYSORTRON -0.382393 0.061694 -6.198209 0.0000 
COUNTYTELEM -0.463313 0.085159 -5.440527 0.0000 
COUNTYTROMSR -0.402691 0.092819 -4.338463 0.0000 
COUNTYVESTA -0.418967 0.099552 -4.208538 0.0000 
COUNTYVESTF -0.301174 0.070655 -4.262593 0.0000 
LOGKVM 2.185925 0.583921 3.743532 0.0002 
LOGKVMSQ -0.252485 0.071383 -3.537049 0.0004 
SOVEROM1*LOGKVM 0.017807 0.020362 0.874504 0.3822 
SOVEROM2*LOGKVM 0.032423 0.021806 1.486871 0.1375 
SOVEROM3*LOGKVM 0.044845 0.023341 1.921239 0.0552 
SOVEROM4*LOGKVM 0.096349 0.024940 3.863291 0.0001 
SOVEROM5*LOGKVM 0.100301 0.032538 3.082592 0.0021 
SOVEROM6*LOGKVM 0.111301 0.041094 2.708490 0.0069 
LNETASJE 0.086504 0.022524 3.840477 0.0001 
HEISMISS 0.131777 0.106032 1.242803 0.2144 
LNETASJEHEIS 0.102226 0.060883 1.679071 0.0936 
BALKONGEGEN 0.036598 0.030901 1.184369 0.2367 
HELDELMOBL 0.034470 0.033262 1.036320 0.3004 
LNHIGHSTD 0.070611 0.029542 2.390156 0.0171 
INCOMEHIGH 0.050723 0.038400 1.320904 0.1870 
SINGLE -0.116017 0.031267 -3.710581 0.0002 
LLMULTICOMP 0.149689 0.040276 3.716570 0.0002 
LLRELFRIEND -0.095637 0.043451 -2.201050 0.0281 
MMEDIATION 0.152326 0.032478 4.690185 0.0000 
TLENGTH25 -0.069091 0.037497 -1.842565 0.0659 
TLENGTH610 -0.150788 0.047228 -3.192774 0.0015 
TLENGTH1115 -0.043730 0.061561 -0.710360 0.4777 
TLENGTH1620 -0.111273 0.121584 -0.915194 0.3604 
     
     R-squared 0.460360    Mean dependent var 8.561763 
Adjusted R-squared 0.425407    S.D. dependent var 0.450720 
S.E. of regression 0.341655    Akaike info criterion 0.750171 
Sum squared resid 73.88884    Schwarz criterion 1.031086 
Log likelihood -211.1826    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.858943 
F-statistic 13.17082    Durbin-Watson stat 1.812768 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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6.4 Parameter stability testing 
Aggregate data: 
 
Dependent Variable: LOGRENT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/12/11   Time: 10:03   
Sample: 1 9557    
Included observations: 9409   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 5.106846 0.152460 33.49640 0.0000 
DUMMYOSLO 0.343359 0.007619 45.06714 0.0000 
LNSIZE 1.395356 0.075784 18.41222 0.0000 
LNSIZESQUARED -0.148138 0.009349 -15.84545 0.0000 
ONEBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.020412 0.002899 7.041871 0.0000 
TWOBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.038326 0.002893 13.24668 0.0000 
THREEBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.056062 0.003439 16.30062 0.0000 
FOURBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.072946 0.004736 15.40212 0.0000 
FIVEBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.090417 0.007431 12.16742 0.0000 
SIXBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.077339 0.015131 5.111298 0.0000 
BALKONG 0.041248 0.007812 5.279910 0.0000 
FURNISHED 0.106040 0.008651 12.25787 0.0000 
LOGHIGHSTD 0.147707 0.007873 18.76153 0.0000 
SINGLE -0.037054 0.007439 -4.981138 0.0000 
MULTICOMPLEX 0.126173 0.009000 14.01938 0.0000 
RELFRIEND -0.269801 0.011053 -24.40884 0.0000 
LENGTH25 -0.060332 0.011765 -5.128284 0.0000 
LENGTH610 -0.183658 0.015342 -11.97086 0.0000 
LENGTH1115 -0.176223 0.017205 -10.24275 0.0000 
LENGTH1620 -0.010039 0.013645 -0.735720 0.4619 
     
     R-squared 0.407835    Mean dependent var 8.616692 
Adjusted R-squared 0.406636    S.D. dependent var 0.444903 
S.E. of regression 0.342709    Akaike info criterion 0.698256 
Sum squared resid 1102.736    Schwarz criterion 0.713453 
Log likelihood -3264.946    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.703416 
F-statistic 340.3354    Durbin-Watson stat 1.630854 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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2010 data: 
 
Dependent Variable: LOGRENT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/11/11   Time: 22:56   
Sample: 1 5315    
Included observations: 5180   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 5.184460 0.200786 25.82082 0.0000 
DUMMYOSLO 0.329532 0.010083 32.68235 0.0000 
LNSIZE 1.462182 0.100178 14.59585 0.0000 
LNSIZESQUARED -0.166723 0.012511 -13.32594 0.0000 
ONEBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.017398 0.006736 2.582703 0.0098 
TWOBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.036470 0.007338 4.970047 0.0000 
THREEBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.056791 0.008062 7.044558 0.0000 
FOURBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.077097 0.009342 8.252742 0.0000 
FIVEBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.097452 0.012412 7.851574 0.0000 
SIXBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.097946 0.018187 5.385496 0.0000 
BALKONG 0.063417 0.009854 6.435606 0.0000 
FURNISHED 0.105946 0.011262 9.407174 0.0000 
LOGHIGHSTD 0.148766 0.009724 15.29838 0.0000 
SINGLE -0.119765 0.010579 -11.32094 0.0000 
MULTICOMPLEX 0.144723 0.011533 12.54843 0.0000 
RELFRIEND -0.240370 0.015059 -15.96201 0.0000 
LENGTH25 -0.062003 0.011586 -5.351794 0.0000 
LENGTH610 -0.163754 0.015882 -10.31043 0.0000 
LENGTH1115 -0.183614 0.023228 -7.904897 0.0000 
LENGTH1620 -0.125852 0.032916 -3.823489 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.425824    Mean dependent var 8.691120 
Adjusted R-squared 0.423709    S.D. dependent var 0.437202 
S.E. of regression 0.331897    Akaike info criterion 0.635869 
Sum squared resid 568.4027    Schwarz criterion 0.661168 
Log likelihood -1626.900    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.644720 
F-statistic 201.4097    Durbin-Watson stat 1.894234 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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2006 data: 
 
Dependent Variable: LOGRENT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/11/11   Time: 23:02   
Sample: 1 4242    
Included observations: 4228   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.771973 0.242701 19.66191 0.0000 
DUMMYOSLO 0.338864 0.011686 28.99771 0.0000 
LNSIZE 1.252372 0.116099 10.78706 0.0000 
LNSIZESQUARED -0.121071 0.014269 -8.484733 0.0000 
ONEBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.024858 0.004059 6.124517 0.0000 
TWOBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.036463 0.004149 8.787664 0.0000 
THREEBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.052292 0.005328 9.814523 0.0000 
FOURBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.068691 0.007764 8.847208 0.0000 
FIVEBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.079366 0.010790 7.355819 0.0000 
SIXBEDROOM*LNSIZE 0.074354 0.036750 2.023224 0.0431 
BALKONG 0.015123 0.012607 1.199530 0.2304 
FURNISHED 0.078674 0.013214 5.953734 0.0000 
LOGHIGHSTD 0.084060 0.016369 5.135228 0.0000 
SINGLE 0.047264 0.011216 4.214118 0.0000 
MULTICOMPLEX 0.098852 0.013942 7.090123 0.0000 
RELFRIEND -0.277432 0.015940 -17.40463 0.0000 
LENGTH25 0.098067 0.075812 1.293556 0.1959 
LENGTH610 0.117387 0.066744 1.758766 0.0787 
LENGTH1115 0.189124 0.063253 2.989968 0.0028 
LENGTH1620 0.355127 0.061508 5.773711 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.377668    Mean dependent var 8.426968 
Adjusted R-squared 0.374858    S.D. dependent var 0.436671 
S.E. of regression 0.345258    Akaike info criterion 0.715672 
Sum squared resid 501.6076    Schwarz criterion 0.745707 
Log likelihood -1492.930    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.726288 
F-statistic 134.4033    Durbin-Watson stat 1.371825 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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6.5.a. Property types 
Studios: 
 
Dependent Variable: LOGRENT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/11/11   Time: 14:48   
Sample (adjusted): 1 1114   
Included observations: 1036 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 7.115076 0.097670 72.84816 0.0000 
DUMMYOSLO 0.227711 0.022118 10.29513 0.0000 
LOGKVM 0.321499 0.022455 14.31779 0.0000 
LNETASJE 0.065433 0.016217 4.034739 0.0001 
HEISMISS 0.217228 0.112045 1.938767 0.0528 
LNETASJEHEIS 0.164494 0.054909 2.995761 0.0028 
BALKONGEGEN 0.022140 0.019596 1.129863 0.2588 
HELDELMOBL 0.049361 0.019558 2.523851 0.0118 
LNHIGHSTD 0.107994 0.020318 5.315217 0.0000 
INCOMEHIGH 0.036869 0.026109 1.412095 0.1582 
SINGLE -0.123714 0.019557 -6.325854 0.0000 
LLMULTICOMP 0.167315 0.030913 5.412409 0.0000 
LLRELFRIEND -0.153474 0.029206 -5.254933 0.0000 
MMEDIATION 0.093736 0.019580 4.787361 0.0000 
LTLS -0.078314 0.017076 -4.586209 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.405657    Mean dependent var 8.497423 
Adjusted R-squared 0.397507    S.D. dependent var 0.371788 
S.E. of regression 0.288583    Akaike info criterion 0.366707 
Sum squared resid 85.02920    Schwarz criterion 0.438277 
Log likelihood -174.9542    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.393862 
F-statistic 49.77597    Durbin-Watson stat 1.197245 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Apartments: 
 
Dependent Variable: LOGRENT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/11/11   Time: 14:50   
Sample (adjusted): 1 2866   
Included observations: 2715 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 7.097848 0.074541 95.22048 0.0000 
DUMMYOSLO 0.302030 0.012332 24.49220 0.0000 
LOGKVM 0.356225 0.017170 20.74743 0.0000 
LNETASJE 0.032739 0.008151 4.016361 0.0001 
HEISMISS 0.065876 0.030111 2.187762 0.0288 
LNETASJEHEIS 0.021193 0.016916 1.252825 0.2104 
BALKONGEGEN 0.054209 0.012040 4.502269 0.0000 
HELDELMOBL 0.115758 0.014331 8.077684 0.0000 
LNHIGHSTD 0.093753 0.012368 7.580024 0.0000 
INCOMEHIGH 0.055595 0.015178 3.662959 0.0003 
SINGLE -0.128393 0.013040 -9.845778 0.0000 
LLMULTICOMP 0.079221 0.012660 6.257579 0.0000 
LLRELFRIEND -0.187440 0.022865 -8.197661 0.0000 
MMEDIATION 0.127233 0.012756 9.974212 0.0000 
LTLS -0.084528 0.010377 -8.146099 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.488772    Mean dependent var 8.808228 
Adjusted R-squared 0.486122    S.D. dependent var 0.416796 
S.E. of regression 0.298781    Akaike info criterion 0.427300 
Sum squared resid 241.0299    Schwarz criterion 0.459933 
Log likelihood -565.0602    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.439098 
F-statistic 184.3861    Durbin-Watson stat 1.184346 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Houses: 
 
Dependent Variable: LOGRENT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 07/06/11   Time: 18:01   
Sample (adjusted): 1 985   
Included observations: 936 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 7.986588 0.150002 53.24312 0.0000 
DUMMYOSLO 0.270101 0.038059 7.096870 0.0000 
LOGKVM 0.106899 0.032389 3.300493 0.0010 
BALKONGEGEN 0.050663 0.028784 1.760125 0.0787 
HELDELMOBL 0.093338 0.031103 3.000911 0.0028 
LNHIGHSTD 0.174440 0.025568 6.822591 0.0000 
INCOMEHIGH 0.072854 0.029854 2.440319 0.0149 
SINGLE -0.192104 0.027534 -6.976898 0.0000 
LLMULTICOMP 0.161432 0.047701 3.384285 0.0007 
LLRELFRIEND -0.084031 0.033836 -2.483437 0.0132 
MMEDIATION 0.251234 0.027665 9.081450 0.0000 
LTLS -0.110564 0.021106 -5.238609 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.356532    Mean dependent var 8.589562 
Adjusted R-squared 0.348872    S.D. dependent var 0.468603 
S.E. of regression 0.378127    Akaike info criterion 0.905566 
Sum squared resid 132.1138    Schwarz criterion 0.967638 
Log likelihood -411.8051    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.929234 
F-statistic 46.54264    Durbin-Watson stat 1.955906 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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6.5.b. Regional differences 
Oslo: 
 
Dependent Variable: LOGRENT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/11/11   Time: 16:01   
Sample: 1 1794    
Included observations: 1671   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 7.082897 0.079245 89.37954 0.0000 
LOGKVM 0.443891 0.018497 23.99794 0.0000 
LNETASJE 0.021217 0.009327 2.274681 0.0231 
HEISMISS 0.063262 0.032972 1.918657 0.0552 
LNETASJEHEIS 0.036432 0.018437 1.976074 0.0483 
BALKONGEGEN 0.061423 0.015415 3.984702 0.0001 
HELDELMOBL 0.051816 0.016826 3.079552 0.0021 
LNHIGHSTD 0.080535 0.016529 4.872279 0.0000 
INCOMEHIGH 0.061091 0.019060 3.205235 0.0014 
SINGLE -0.114546 0.017020 -6.729989 0.0000 
LLMULTICOMP 0.082360 0.016049 5.131768 0.0000 
LLRELFRIEND -0.208564 0.028109 -7.419907 0.0000 
MMEDIATION 0.140469 0.016090 8.730059 0.0000 
LTLS -0.086845 0.013156 -6.600986 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.493646    Mean dependent var 8.927744 
Adjusted R-squared 0.489674    S.D. dependent var 0.416620 
S.E. of regression 0.297621    Akaike info criterion 0.422352 
Sum squared resid 146.7743    Schwarz criterion 0.467772 
Log likelihood -338.8752    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.439181 
F-statistic 124.2628    Durbin-Watson stat 1.323427 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Hordaland: 
 
Dependent Variable: LOGRENT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/11/11   Time: 15:55   
Sample: 1 571    
Included observations: 529   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 7.418317 0.176247 42.09058 0.0000 
LOGKVM 0.264344 0.037850 6.984020 0.0000 
LNETASJE 0.139926 0.029442 4.752656 0.0000 
HEISMISS 0.661428 0.325132 2.034337 0.0424 
LNETASJEHEIS 0.298967 0.157270 1.900978 0.0579 
BALKONGEGEN 0.029029 0.029124 0.996759 0.3193 
HELDELMOBL 0.083294 0.030543 2.727125 0.0066 
LNHIGHSTD 0.095099 0.030810 3.086620 0.0021 
INCOMEHIGH 0.079497 0.038625 2.058185 0.0401 
SINGLE -0.182911 0.032314 -5.660515 0.0000 
LLMULTICOMP 0.131767 0.033760 3.903061 0.0001 
LLRELFRIEND -0.184946 0.047729 -3.874927 0.0001 
MMEDIATION 0.149142 0.030575 4.877884 0.0000 
LTLS -0.135501 0.025050 -5.409336 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.425332    Mean dependent var 8.663819 
Adjusted R-squared 0.410826    S.D. dependent var 0.408859 
S.E. of regression 0.313831    Akaike info criterion 0.546182 
Sum squared resid 50.72218    Schwarz criterion 0.659214 
Log likelihood -130.4651    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.590428 
F-statistic 29.32077    Durbin-Watson stat 1.586389 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Sør Trøndelag: 
 
Dependent Variable: LOGRENT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/11/11   Time: 15:57   
Sample: 1 393    
Included observations: 365   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 7.314523 0.232095 31.51525 0.0000 
LOGKVM 0.241452 0.050261 4.803926 0.0000 
LNETASJE 0.191200 0.034673 5.514462 0.0000 
HEISMISS 0.397926 0.165647 2.402246 0.0168 
LNETASJEHEIS 0.182997 0.084013 2.178199 0.0301 
BALKONGEGEN 0.068393 0.038655 1.769335 0.0777 
HELDELMOBL 0.071192 0.043894 1.621921 0.1057 
LNHIGHSTD 0.171018 0.038454 4.447293 0.0000 
INCOMEHIGH -0.036396 0.049066 -0.741792 0.4587 
SINGLE -0.108642 0.041127 -2.641602 0.0086 
LLMULTICOMP 0.236560 0.052043 4.545430 0.0000 
LLRELFRIEND -0.204318 0.058938 -3.466661 0.0006 
MMEDIATION 0.130717 0.039931 3.273534 0.0012 
LTLS -0.122310 0.033635 -3.636414 0.0003 
     
     R-squared 0.399585    Mean dependent var 8.608932 
Adjusted R-squared 0.377348    S.D. dependent var 0.425981 
S.E. of regression 0.336135    Akaike info criterion 0.694992 
Sum squared resid 39.65829    Schwarz criterion 0.844577 
Log likelihood -112.8361    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.754439 
F-statistic 17.96891    Durbin-Watson stat 2.002085 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Rogaland: 
 
Dependent Variable: LOGRENT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/11/11   Time: 15:59   
Sample: 1 419    
Included observations: 378   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 7.143990 0.223726 31.93185 0.0000 
LOGKVM 0.287516 0.049133 5.851809 0.0000 
LNETASJE 0.117396 0.041646 2.818881 0.0051 
HEISMISS -0.350225 0.485096 -0.721970 0.4708 
LNETASJEHEIS -0.198634 0.273314 -0.726758 0.4678 
BALKONGEGEN 0.069888 0.041746 1.674127 0.0950 
HELDELMOBL 0.120348 0.041710 2.885394 0.0041 
LNHIGHSTD 0.215732 0.039468 5.466065 0.0000 
INCOMEHIGH 0.049995 0.046988 1.063993 0.2880 
SINGLE -0.070728 0.040029 -1.766908 0.0781 
LLMULTICOMP 0.208295 0.062681 3.323083 0.0010 
LLRELFRIEND -0.079189 0.057340 -1.381042 0.1681 
MMEDIATION 0.124955 0.042263 2.956614 0.0033 
LTLS -0.118385 0.034723 -3.409419 0.0007 
     
     R-squared 0.396167    Mean dependent var 8.653148 
Adjusted R-squared 0.374601    S.D. dependent var 0.463008 
S.E. of regression 0.366156    Akaike info criterion 0.864822 
Sum squared resid 48.80167    Schwarz criterion 1.010558 
Log likelihood -149.4513    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.922662 
F-statistic 18.37040    Durbin-Watson stat 1.800823 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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1.0 Introduction 
Studies of the valuation of housing attributes have been conducted for numerous 
markets. However, empirical analyses of this nature for the Norwegian market are 
less common. Rental prices are made up of many characteristics, all of which may 
affect its value. This should be of importance to appraisers who make market-
derived rent adjustments, property managers and developers who design real 
estate projects. From an investors perspective it will also be of great importance to 
know which attributes that can increase the rent compared to its cost, and thereby 
maximize the return of the investment.  
 There are several issues that affect the rent in the Norwegian rental market, 
and in this paper we will examine four issues. First of all we will employ 
attributes/characteristics with the physical units and properties of the physical 
surroundings in order to explain variation in rent. Second, the effect of landlord 
characteristics will be employed, focusing on the difference between small- scale 
landlords and large- scale landlords. It is expected that large- scale landlords set 
higher rents, as they are more able to diversify the risk and are likely to possess 
more knowledge of the market. Large- scale landlords are able to accept that some 
contracts may be problematic, allowing for a higher frequency of exit and/or 
damage to the property. They may therefore include premiums as an insurance 
against vacancy and depreciation in their offered rent. Small-scale landlords often 
have the tenant as a neighbor. This will stimulate a selection process not only 
motivated by revenue, but also of the tenants personality, giving the landlord 
incentive to give a discount in order to be more selective.   Third, we will examine 
if the relationship between landlord and tenant has an affect on the rental price. If 
there is a relationship, either direct or indirect, it is expected to have a rent 
reduction effect. This is supported by basic risk- return theory, as previous 
knowledge of the tenant will reduce the risk and the landlord is therefore likely to 
give a discount. Finally, the length- of- residence might have an affect on the rent, 
and will be examined further. A tenant that has proven to pay rent on time and 
takes good care of the residence is more likely to be preferred over the risk 
associated with new tenants. Landlords might therefore be willing to reduce the 
rent through negotiations, or more likely, pass on the opportunity of nominal rent 
adjustments.  
 Hedonic regression analysis is typically used to estimate the marginal 
contribution of different characteristics. A hedonic regression that has been widely 
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employed rests upon the work of Freeman (1993). He again built his work on 
Rosen’s (1974) two- stage method. Rosen defines hedonic prices as the implicit 
prices of attributes and are revealed to economic agents from observed prices of 
differentiated products and the specific amounts of characteristics associated with 
them. In the first stage of Rosen’s method we will estimate a hedonic price 
function for housing attributes and in the second stage we will estimate the inverse 
demand function for these attributes. Housing supply is assumed to be fixed, and 
all housing attributes are assumed to be continuous. Our study will utilize cross-
sectional data from all of Norway, divided into eight geographical regions.   
  
2.0 Background literature 
In this section we will go through previous literature concerning our research 
questions. There have been conducted a variety of study`s regarding some of the 
research topics, while some topics is yet to be fully exploited. 
 
The effect of property- specific characteristics and surroundings  
There has been conducted numerous studies on the relationship between several 
groups of factors and market rent. Most of these studies measure the effect of 
physical characteristics.  
 Sirmans, Sirmans and Benjamins (1989) empirical results show in their 
examination of multifamily housing amenities, services and external factors that 
some amenities and services are consistently important determinants of the rent. 
Examples of external factors that affect the rent are traffic congestion and access 
to public transportation according to the study.  
 The results from a later study by Sirmans, Sirmans and Benjamin (1990) 
show that amenities such as designated parking, maid service and modern kitchen 
seem to be consistently valued by tenants, based on a linear model. Other 
characteristics, however, such as patios, playgrounds and boat/camper parking did 
not have significant effects on the rental price.  
 Gunterman and Norrbin (1987) ran a regression analysis of rent variations in 
a university submarket. The regression show that age and condition, common area 
amenities and extra bedrooms for a given apartment unit size have a significant 
affect on the rental price.  
 Marshall (1990) categorizes attributes into two groups, attributes preferred 
to be included during the construction phase and attributes that could be 
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added/changed after the construction phase. In his study of student rentals, 
Marshall find that number of bedrooms, swimming pool, distance from campus 
and complex size have a positive impact on the rental price. Pet restriction also 
had a positive effect while having a patio actually lowered rent.  
 Smith and Belloit (1987) identify 20 variables as important determinants of 
rent in their appraisal book. They find that amenities such as dish washer, tennis 
court, utilities included, sauna and furnished units have a significantly positive 
effect on rent. Coefficients for variables representing the number of bathrooms 
and bedrooms are also significantly positive, while coefficients such as leasing 
period, neighborhood quality and location convenience was significantly negative.  
 In the studies above, amenities, services, and physical characteristics have 
been proven to affect rent, but the data yield different estimates for the factors. 
This indicates that location may affect the estimates because different populations 
may have different preferences. Three studies that validate the indication of the 
importance of proximity to an economic focal point such as the city center or a 
campus are the studies of Jaffe and Bussa (1977), Marks (1984) and Prave and 
Ord (1987).  
 
Location  
Smith and Kroll (1988) combine market research with selected statistical 
techniques in a study where they demonstrate that marginal values on selected 
factors differ by different tenant profiles and geographic areas.  In a later study, 
Smith and Kroll (1989) try to identify groups with a higher utility for selected 
project or unit amenities. The results show that constellations of distinctive 
demographic groups based on age and income variables do exist and that price 
elasticity varies across clusters in certain cases. This may allow an investor to 
optimize rental rate structures and thereby maximizing the value of an investment. 
The cost of providing the factors that is increasing rent in relationship to the 
additional rent collected, was investigated by Sirmans, Sirmans and Benjamin 
(1989). The authors  also present a model for this comparison.  
 In a study by Ogur (1973) it was found that colleges and universities have a 
significant effect on rental markets, causing an increase in the rental prices in the 
nearby areas. This was also tested by Jaffe and Bussa (1975), who found that rent 
declined as distances from the university increased.  
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Length of Residence Discounts 
Previous academic literature on rental contracts has predicted that landlords will 
attempt to minimize costs relating to turnover by giving discount to long-term 
tenants. Merrill (1977), Lowery (1980), and Marshall and Guasch (1983) all found 
a substantial discount associated between rents and tenure length. Contrary, 
Goodman and Kawai (1985) found that the transaction costs of moving, makes 
incentives for tenants to “grow into” a living unit, thereby allowing a rise of rent. 
This is backed by the study conducted by Barker in 2003 where he finds that 
residential with low turnover costs will charge long-term tenants higher rent than 
short-term tenants. He shows further that length-of-residence discounts are less 
common than discounts on the first month`s rent for new tenants 
. 
Small- scale versus large- scale landlords  
There has not been a lot of research on the relationship between market rent and 
the size of the lessor, but Larsen and Sommervoll (2006) found in their analysis 
that small- scale landlords tend to set lower rents than large- scale landlords.  
 
Relationship between landlord and tenant 
The effect of the relationship between lessor and tenant on rent, are also not 
widely explored. Larsen and Sommervoll (2006) tested for this in their study and 
found indications for reduced rent if there where a direct or indirect relationship 
between the lessor and tenant. The authors explain the result with a hypothesis of 
reduced risk due to more information.  
 
3.0 Hedonic theory  
In this part of the paper we will introduce the theoretical aspects of hedonic 
analysis. Initially, we will discuss the hedonic model and its application for the 
housing rental market.  Secondly, we will show that hedonic analysis is a natural 
point of departure when examining the relationship between price and 
attributes/characteristics.  
 In classical microeconomic consumer theory, the choice of the consumer is 
based upon maximization of the utility function specified in the quantities 
consumed as subject to a financial constraint (Kristensen 1984). This gives 
beautiful results, but has been criticized for the lack of realism. The hedonic 
hypothesis state that goods do not, per se, provide utility to the consumer, but are 
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instead valued for their utility- bearing attributes (Lancaster 1966). Such an 
extension renders possible studies of heterogeneous goods within the framework 
of the classical consumer theory, and will produce a direct link between the 
market price and attributes of a complex good such as housing. 
 Rosen presented in 1974 a framework for the study of differentiated 
products. Rosen`s point of departure is that a class of commodities can be 
described by n attributes or characteristics, . The 
components of z are assumed objectively measured in the sense that all 
consumers` perceptions of the characteristics embodied in each commodity are 
identical. It is further assumed that a sufficiently large number of differentiated 
products are available so that choice among various combinations of z is 
continuous for practical purposes. 
 Each differentiated commodity has a quoted market price and is associated 
with a fix value of the vector z which implicitly reveals a function 
 relating prices and characteristics. The main objective for hedonic 
theory is therefore to explain how an equilibrium relationship is determined. In 
order to simplify, it is assumed that consumers are rational in the sense that, if two 
goods possess the same set of attributes, they will only consider the cheapest, and 
seller’s identity is of no importance. 
 In the first step of explaining the determination of market equilibrium, 
Rosen (1974) assumes that the utility function of the household can be defined as 
, where x is a vector of all other commodities than the class 
of goods and , are the attributes for this class.  represents a taste 
determining vector for the characteristics, hence differing between individuals. 
When further assuming separability between x and zi, then constrained utility 
maximization leads to the bid function explaining the maximum amount 
residences would be willing to pay for different bundles of attributes at given level 
of utility: , where y represents the residential income. With 
accordance to general financial theory we assume that individuals prefer more to 
less , and that marginal utility are declining. . 
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Figure 3.1 Households bid function 
 Symmetrically, Rosen (1974) defines the producer`s offer function by 
means of ordinary profit maximization to define the minimum price the producer 
is willing to accept for different bundles of attributes at a given level of profit: 
 where M denotes the number of units produced by firm 
of designs offering. The shift parameter  reflects the underlying variables in the 
cost minimization problem, namely, factor prices and production function 
parameters. It is assumed that , and . 
 
Figure 3.2 Producers offer function 
 The market equilibrium between the market prices and the attributes of the 
class of differentiated goods considered is then obtained from the tangency of the 
offer and bid functions. This tangency develops a common envelope function 
denoted , which is the implicit price function, or frequently called hedonic 
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price function illustrated in figure 3.3 below (Griliches 1971). 
 
Figure 3.3 Hedonic price function 
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4.0 The Sample 
The sample used to estimate the price functions consist of observations on 13.039 
residential rentals in Norway for the period October 2009 to February 2010, and is 
collected by Statistics of Norway through their yearly rental market survey. 
Statistics of Norway use the collected data to prepare statistics and further 
research for the Norwegian rental market since 2005. 
The population is residential rentals in Norway. Unfortunately, it does not 
exist any absolute index of such rentals. A combination of different governmental 
registers contained by Statistics of Norway is therefore used as basis, in order to 
establish a sample that maximize the share of residences. In 2010 Statistics of 
Norway used the following procedure for sample allocation: - Owner Information from Statistics of Norway's Ground Parcel, Address 
and Building Register (GAB) was connected to the information from the 
Central Population Register in order to remove freehold residential. - Information on the organizational structure from Statistics of Norway`s 
Corporate and Business Register (BOF) was match to the residential 
register to remove co-operative shareholders and certain institutions. 
 
The majority of the sample consisted of 20 000 residences where Oslo was 
oversampled, i.e. a sample of 18 000 observation was based on the Norwegian 
population, while adding 2 000 residences from Oslo. The reasoning behind this 
weighting is the significant attention for the Oslo residential rental market and the 
volatility in rental prices across Oslo`s submarkets. Furthermore, 8 000 
observations from residences age 20 to 29 was added stochastically from all 
municipalities in Norway. This was initiated in order to increase the allocation 
from this segment, and thereby cope with problems concerning students registered 
at ancestors’ residence while living elsewhere. As around 50 percent of this 
segment lives in residential rentals25
 
, age is a criterion in order to reach the 
segment. The region share of the segment corresponds to the proportion of the 
population in this age group through the different regions. 
Withdrawals 
Of the 28 000 residences that constituted the original sample 31 was removed as 
                                                 25 Statistics of Norway Report 2004/28 
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the residential was owned by an institution, destroyed by fire, or was condemned. 
In addition, residences were dismissed as they did not want or were prevented 
from participating in the survey. There was also a share that was unreachable.  
The total withdrawals amounted to 14 961 residences, 53,4 percent of the total 
sample, and is illustrated on region-, age-, and education- level in table below. 
 
  Interviewed Refusal Prevented Not sent Not attempt Other withdrawals   Number 
Total 46,5 7,8 1,5 29,6 8,6 6 
 
27969 
County                 
Oslo 48,7 5,4 1,9 30,9 7,8 5,2 
 
6324 
Akershus 45,2 7,3 1,7 31,8 8,4 5,6 
 
2062 
Hedmark and Oppland 44,4 9,4 1,5 28,4 10 6,3 
 
1717 
Østlandet 42,6 8,7 1,4 31,1 10,2 6 
 
4498 
Agder and Rogaland 49,7 9,3 1,5 26,7 7,3 5,5 
 
4473 
Vestlandet 47,2 8,9 1,3 28 8,4 6,2 
 
4208 
Midt-Norge 46,6 7,3 0,9 29,6 9 6,6 
 
2286 
Nord-Norge 43,2 7 1,7 30,4 9,7 8 
 
2401 
Age                 
Below 25 36 4,9 0,4 40,7 9,1 7,9 
 
5273 
25 - 34 47,5 6,3 1 29,5 9,4 6,2 
 
11369 
35 - 44 46,2 7,7 1,9 28,6 9,6 6 
 
4365 
45 - 66 51,4 10,5 2,4 23,8 7,6 4,4 
 
4984 
67 and older 54,6 16,9 4,4 17,3 3,4 3,4   1978 
Education                 
Compulsary school 37,6 9,3 1,5 34,6 10,5 6,5 
 
9060 
High School 54,6 7,7 0,6 24,4 7,5 5,3 
 
16145 
Higher education 59,5 11,9 2,4 11,9 4,8 9,5 
 
42 
Unresigned 28,2 3,2 7,2 44 9,3 8,3   2722 
Table 4.1  Response rate and withdrawals by region, age, and education of basis sample   
 
From the table we observe that withdrawals were mainly caused by problems 
related to contacting the residences. These withdrawals amounted to 29,6 percent 
of the gross sample, or 55,3 percent of the total withdrawals.  Refusal as cause of 
withdrawal did not constitute to any major problem. However, some segments 
stands out. For the oldest segment, especially those aged 66 or older had a refusal 
rate of 16,9 percent while the average refusal rate was 6,9 percent. Furthermore, 
the segment with higher educational background had a refusal rate of 11,9 percent 
while 7,2 percent listed with unknown education were prevented from 
participating. Interestingly, we observe that the group aged 25 or younger had a 
response rate of only 36,9 percent although the refusal rate is low. 
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5.0 The Model and Data 
To determine the extent to which certain locational, physical, amenity, service, 
tenant/landlord, and contract factors influence residential rent, the following 
model is utilized:  
 
      and   
 
where 
 
 =  the observed rent on the ith residential unit 
 =  a set of location variables distinguishing different regions in 
Norway specifying the location of the ith residential based on 
census tracts. 
 =  a set of j physical characteristics for the ith residential. These 
characteristics include: 
a) The type of residential (a series of dummy variables is 
used to indicate detached house, apartment, lodging, 
etc.) 
b) The type of surroundings (a series of dummy variables 
is used to indicate single houses, pure residential 
buildings, agriculture area etc.) 
c) size of the residential unit 
d) the number of rooms 
e) the number of bedrooms 
f) the number of bathrooms  
g) the type of furnishing (a series of dummy variables is 
used to indicate totally furnished, partly furnished or 
not furnished) 
h) the access kitchen (a series of dummy variables is used 
to indicate own kitchen, access to kitchen) 
i) tiled bathroom 
j) balcony, patio, garden, or porch (a series of dummy 
variables is used to indicate own, or access to) 
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k) storage room (a series of dummy variables is used to 
indicate location of storage room) 
l) fire place 
m) wheelchair accessibility  throughout the residential 
 = a set of amenities of size j for the ith residential. These amenities 
are: 
a) view from residential (fjord, ocean, city, mountains, 
woodland, etc.) 
b) sight from living room (more than 200 meters) 
c) covered parking (a series of dummy variables is used to 
indicate own garage, common garage, or parking space) 
d) washing machine (a series of dummy variables is used 
to indicate socket,  or access to washing machine/ 
laundry room) 
 =   a set of services of size j for the ith residential. These services 
include: 
a) electricity 
b) heating 
c) hallway wash 
d) cable television 
e) broad band 
 =  a set of j tenant and landlord characteristics for the ith residential. 
These characteristics include: 
a) rental sharing (a series of dummy variables is used to 
indicate cohabitant, spouse, partner) 
b) the number of children 
c) the type of landlord 
d) the number of rent contributors 
e) Residence or institution paying the rent 
f) the employment status (a series of dummy variables is 
used to indicate employed, self-employed, unemployed, 
student, receives unemployment benefits) 
 =    a set of j contract characteristics for the ith residential 
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g) the amount for deposit 
h) the length of contract 
i) the tenure length 
j) the contract date 
k) the rental starting date 
 
Before a reliable model can be estimated, two preliminary issues should be 
resolved. The first issue concerns heteroscedasticity resulting from the use of 
cross-section data. This issue was resolved in a similar study by Guntermann and 
Norrbin (1987) who used a log-linear specification. All continuous variables will 
therefore appear in logged form.  
 The second issue concerns the large amount of variables used to explain 
the rent.  With a large number of variables, the model is likely to have a high 
degree of multicollinearity. The result would be an estimated equation that is 
biased in which terms that are important and we might not get the market value of 
the singular attributes. For this reason, Guntermann and Norrbin (1987) used 
several different specifications of facility or amenity indexes in subsequent 
estimation of the models, including a principal component analysis.  
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6.0 Thesis Progression Plan 
 
20th of January to 15th of February: Preparation for presentation of preliminary 
thesis. 
 
15th of February to 25th of March: Revise thesis based on feedback from 
presentation. 
 
25th of March to 10th of April: Initiate regressions based on research questions 
and objectives of the thesis.  
 
10th of April to 10th of June: Complete thesis draft and delivery to supervisor for 
feedback. 
 
1th of July to 1th of August: Revise thesis based on feedback from supervisor. 
 
1th of August: Delivery of final thesis. 
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8.0 Appendix 
Variable coding 
VALUE TE_6F 
   1   -   1 = 'Ja' 
   2   -   2 = 'Ja, men ektefelle, samboer eller partner svarer for IO' 
   3   -   3 = 'Nei' 
   4   -   4 = 'Finner ikke ny beboer' 
   5   -   5 = 'Tom bolig' 
   6   -   6 = 'Sendt inn postalt skjema' 
   7   -   7 = 'Annet' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
 VALUE TE_7F 
   1   -   1 = '16-24 år' 
   2   -   2 = '25-44 år' 
   3   -   3 = '45-66 år' 
   4   -   4 = '67-79 år' 
   5   -   5 = '80- år' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
 VALUE TE_4F 
   1   -   1 = 'Mann' 
   2   -   2 = 'Kvinne' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
 VALUE TE_5F 
   1   -   1 = 'Akershus og Oslo' 
   2   -   2 = 'Hedmark og Oppland' 
   3   -   3 = 'Østlandet ellers' 
   4   -   4 = 'Agder og Rogaland' 
   5   -   5 = 'Vestlandet' 
   6   -   6 = 'Trøndelag' 
   7   -   7 = 'Nord-Norge' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
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   ; 
 VALUE TE_8F 
   1   -   1 = 'frittliggende enebolig,' 
   2   -   2 = 'våningshus, kårbolig eller annet hus tilknyttet gårdsbruk,' 
   3   -   3 = 'kjedet enebolig, rekkehus, tomannsbolig eller generasjonsbolig,' 
   4   -   4 = 'leilighet i blokk, i bygård, i firemanns- eller seksmannsbolig, i 
terrassehus eller i annet flerbolighus,' 
   5   -   5 = 'hybel eller hybelleilighet med egen inngang,' 
   6   -   6 = 'hybel eller hybelleilighet uten egen inngang,' 
   7   -   7 = 'annen type hus eller leilighet?' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
 VALUE TE_1F 
   1   -   1 = 'Ja' 
   2   -   2 = 'Nei' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
 VALUE TE_9F 
   1   -   1 = 'en leilighet,' 
   2   -   2 = 'en hybel eller hybelleilighet med egen inngang eller,' 
   3   -   3 = 'en hybel eller hybelleilighet uten egen inngang?' 
   4   -   4 = 'Annen type bolig' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
 VALUE TE_10F 
   1   -   1 = 'Selveier alene eller gjennom sameie' 
   2   -   2 = 'Borettslag, boligaksjeselskap' 
   3   -   3 = 'Annet' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
 VALUE TE_11F 
   1   -   1 = 'Leier' 
   2   -   2 = 'Disponerer på annen måte' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
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 VALUE TE_12F 
   1   -   1 = 'slektninger,' 
   2   -   2 = 'venner,' 
   3   -   3 = 'en annen privatperson,' 
   4   -   4 = 'en privat gårdeier eller et gårdselskap,' 
   5   -   5 = 'kommunen' 
   6   -   6 = 'gjennom arbeidet' 
   7   -   7 = 'Studentsamskipnaden/en studentboligstiftelse' 
   8   -   8 = 'eller andre?' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
 VALUE TE_13F 
   1   -   1 = 'Ja' 
   2   -   2 = 'Vet Ikke' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
 VALUE TE_14F 
   1   -   1 = 'Under 20 kvadratmeter,' 
   2   -   2 = '20 - 39 kvadratmeter,' 
   3   -   3 = '40 - 59 kvadratmeter,' 
   4   -   4 = 'eller 60 - 79 kvadratmeter' 
   5   -   5 = '80 - 99 kvadratmeter,' 
   6   -   6 = '100 - 119 kvadratmeter,' 
   7   -   7 = 'eller 120 kvadratmeter eller mer' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
 VALUE TE_15F 
   1   -   1 = 'Kjeller/sokkel/underetasje' 
   2   -   2 = '1. etasje' 
   3   -   3 = '2. etasje' 
   4   -   4 = '3. etasje' 
   5   -   5 = '4. etasje' 
   6   -   6 = '5. etasje eller høyere' 
   7   -   7 = 'over flere etasjer' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
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   ; 
 VALUE TE_16F 
   1   -   1 = 'enslige hus, ingen hus innen 200 meter,' 
   2   -   2 = 'ren boligbebyggelse,' 
   3   -   3 = 'landbruksområde,' 
   4   -   4 = 'blandet bolig- og landbruksområde,' 
   5   -   5 = 'blandet bolig-, forretnings- eller industristrøk,' 
   6   -   6 = 'annet' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
 VALUE TE_17F 
   1   -   1 = 'Møblert - kunne ha bodd der uten noen egne møbler og hvitevarer' 
   2   -   2 = 'Delvis møblert - må ha noen egne møbler og/eller hvitevarer for å bo 
der' 
   3   -   3 = 'Umøblert' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
 VALUE TE_18F 
   1   -   1 = 'Annonse, aviser, Internett, profesjonelle byråer' 
   2   -   2 = 'familie,venner' 
   3   -   3 = 'kolleger, arbeidsforhold' 
   4   -   4 = 'eller på annen måte?' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
 VALUE TE_19F 
   1   -   1 = 'Oktober' 
   2   -   2 = 'November' 
   3   -   3 = 'Desember' 
   4   -   4 = 'Januar' 
   5   -   5 = 'Februar' 
   6   -   6 = 'Mars' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
 VALUE TE_20F 
   1   -   1 = 'Heltid' 
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   2   -   2 = 'Deltid' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
   ; 
 VALUE TE_21F 
   1   -   1 = 'januar' 
   2   -   2 = 'februar' 
   3   -   3 = 'mars' 
   4   -   4 = 'april' 
   5   -   5 = 'mai' 
   6   -   6 = 'juni' 
   7   -   7 = 'juli' 
   8   -   8 = 'august' 
   9   -   9 = 'september' 
   10   -   10 = 'oktober' 
   11   -   11 = 'november' 
   12   -   12 = 'desember' 
   OTHER = 'Uoppgitt' 
    ; 
  LABEL 
    IO_Numme  = 'IOs id-nummer innafor skjemaet' 
    Delutval  = 'IO tilhører delutvalg' 
    Resultat  = 'Resultat' 
    BorDu     = 'Bor du på adressen:' 
  /* IOs_Alde  = 'IOs alder på intervjutidspunktet' */ 
    AldGrupp  = 'IOs aldersgruppe' 
    IOs_Kjon  = 'IOs kjønn' 
    IOs_Komm  = 'IOs bokommune ved intervjuet' 
    Landsdel  = 'Landsdel' 
    Spm1      = 'Hva slags hus eller leilighet bor du i?' 
  /* Spm1_Tek  = 'Her står det noe, blank = blank' */ 
    Spm1sps   = 'Hva slags hus eller leilighet du bor i' 
    Spm1a     = 'Er boligen en type leilighet' 
    Spm2      = 'Er det innredet ekstra bolig i kjeller/loft' 
    Spm3      = 'Bor i hoveddel av huset' 
    Spm4      = 'Er den delen av huset du bor i ...' 
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    Spm5      = 'Eier boligen du bor i' 
    Spm6      = 'Eier boligen som selveier/gj borettslag/boligaksjeselskap' 
    Spm7      = 'Deler boligen med noen' 
    Spm8a     = 'Bor sammen med samboer/ektefelle/partner' 
    Spm8b     = 'Bor sammen med barn under 16 år' 
    Spm8c     = 'Bor sammen med barn 16 år og oppover' 
    Spm8d     = 'Bor sammen med venner/kollektiv' 
    Spm8e     = 'Bor sammen med foreldre' 
    Spm8f     = 'Bor sammen med søsken' 
    Spm8g     = 'Bor sammen med andre' 
    Spm8h     = 'Antall barn under 16 år i boligen' 
    Spm9      = 'Eier noen av de du bor sammen med boligen' 
    Spm10a    = 'Samboer/ektefelle eier boligen' 
    Spm10b    = 'Barn under 16 år eier boligen' 
    Spm10c    = 'Barn 16 år og oppover eier boligen' 
    Spm10d    = 'Søsken eier boligen' 
    Spm10e    = 'Andre eier boligen' 
    Spm11     = 'Leier du boligen eller disponerer du den' 
   /* Spm11Tek  = 'Her står det noe, blank = blank' */ 
    Spm11Sps  = 'På hvilken måte disponerer du boligen?' 
    Spm12     = 'Leier du boligen av ...' 
  /* Spm12Tek  = 'Her står det noe, blank = blank' */ 
    Spm12sps  = 'Hvem leier du av' 
    Spm13     = 'Bor du i samme bygning som eier' 
    Spm14ja   = 'Har oppgitt areal' 
    Spm14     = 'Omtrent hvor mange kvadratmeter er boligen' 
    Spm15a_b  = 'Plassere boligen i et av følgende arealintervall' 
    Spm16     = 'Hvor mange rom med vindu har boligen' 
    Spm17     = 'Hvor mange rom med badekar/dusj i boligen du leier' 
    Spm18     = 'Har boligen tilgang på bad med dusj/badekar' 
    Spm19     = 'Antall toalett i boligen' 
    Spm20a    = 'Har boligen eget kjøkken/kjøkkenkrok med vannkran' 
    Spm20b    = 'Har boligen tilgang til kjøkken' 
    Spm20c    = 'Har bod i boligen' 
    Spm20d    = 'Har boligen bod på loft, kjeller eller andre steder' 
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    Spm20e    = 'Har boligen uttak for egen vaskemaskin' 
    Spm20f    = 'Har boligen tilgang til vaskemaskin' 
    Spm20g    = 'Har boligen egen balkong/terrasse/veranda/hage' 
    Spm20h    = 'Har boligen tilgang på balkong/terrasse m.m' 
    Spm20i    = 'Har boligen egen garasje eller garasjeplass' 
    Spm20j    = 'Har boligen garasje i fellesgarasje' 
    Spm20k    = 'Har boligen egen biloppstillingsplass' 
    Spm20l    = 'Har boligen egen inngang' 
    Spm20m    = 'Har boligen kabel-TV/parabol' 
    Spm20n    = 'Har boligen varmekabler på bad' 
    Spm20o    = 'Har boligen parkett/tregulv i stue' 
    Spm20p    = 'Har boligen flislagt bad' 
    Spm20q    = 'Har boligen bredbånd' 
    Spm20r    = 'Har boligen åpen eller lukket peis for ved' 
    Spm21     = 'I hvilken etasje ligger boligen' 
    Spm22     = 'Hvor mange soverom med vindu har boligen' 
    Spm23     = 'Hvor mange andre oppholdsrom med vindu har boligen' 
    Spm24     = 'Hvor mange rom med badekar eller dusj er det i boligen' 
    Spm25     = 'Hvor mange toalett er det i boligen' 
    Spm26a    = 'Har boligen kjeller' 
    Spm26b    = 'Har boligen loft' 
    Spm26c    = 'Har boligen garasje' 
    Spm26d    = 'Har boligen sentralstøvsuger' 
    Spm26e    = 'Har boligen kabel-TV/parabol' 
    Spm26f    = 'Har boligen varmekabler på bad' 
    Spm26g    = 'Har boligen parkett i stue' 
    Spm26h    = 'Har boligen flislagt bad' 
    Spm26i    = 'Har boligen bredbånd' 
    Spm26j    = 'Har boligen åpen eller lukket peis for ved' 
    Spm27     = 'Har boligen mer enn ca. 200 m. fri sikt fra stuevinduet' 
    Spm28a    = 'Har boligen utsikt til fjord' 
    Spm28b    = 'Har boligen utsikt til hav' 
    Spm28c    = 'Har boligen utsikt til by eller bygd' 
    Spm28d    = 'Har boligen utsikt til fjell' 
    Spm28e    = 'Har boligen utsikt til åker' 
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    Spm28f    = 'Har boligen utsikt til skog' 
    Spm28g    = 'Har boligen utsikt til industriområde' 
    Spm28h    = 'Har boligen utsikt til trafikkert vei' 
    Spm28i    = 'Har boligen utsikt til jernbanelinje' 
    Spm28j    = 'Har boligen utsikt til annet' 
    Spm28sps  = 'Hvis annet spesifiser' 
    Spm29     = 'Hva slags bebyggelse er det i nabolaget' 
    Spm30     = 'Leier du boligen møblert, delvis møblert' 
    Spm31     = 'Avtale med utleier om å utføre ulike typer arbeidsoppgaver' 
    Spm32a    = 'HAGEARBEID F.EKS. KLIPPE OG/ELLER VANNE PLEN' 
    Spm32b    = 'MÅKE SNØ, RYDDE INNKJØRSEL O.L.' 
    Spm32c    = 'VASKE FELLESAREAL F.EKS. OPPGANG, TRAPP' 
    Spm32d    = 'PASS AV BARN' 
    Spm32e    = 'PASS AV HUND/KATT' 
    Spm32f    = 'OPPUSSING/OPPGRADERING AV STANDARDEN TIL 
BOLIGEN' 
    Spm32g    = 'FOREFALLENDE HÅNDVERK, ELEKTRISKE 
JUSTERINGER' 
    Spm32h    = 'RENGJØRING' 
    Spm32i    = 'ANNET FOREFALLENDE ARBEID' 
    Spm33     = 'Hvordan fikk du tak i boligen' 
  /* spm33tek  = 'Her står det noe, blank = blank' */ 
    spm33sps  = 'Hvilken annen måte' 
    Spm34     = 'Husleie for boligen' 
    Spm34a    = 'For hvilken måned gjelder husleien' 
    Spm35     = 'Hva er din andel av husleien' 
    Spm36     = 'Hvor mange bidrar til å betale husleien' 
    Spm37     = 'Mottar du/dere støtte for å betale husle' 
    Spm38a_1  = 'kommunen betaler støtten' 
    Spm38a_2  = 'arbeidsgiver betaler støtten' 
    Spm38a_3  = 'andre betaler støtten' 
    Spm39     = 'Har du for tiden inntektsgivende arbeid' 
    Spm40     = 'Jobber du heltid eller deltid' 
    Spm41a    = 'Er ansatt eller selvstendig næringsdrivende' 
    Spm41b    = 'Er arbeidsledig og jobbsøkende' 
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    Spm41c    = 'Er på arbeidsmarkedstiltak' 
    Spm41d    = 'Er student eller skoleelev' 
    Spm41e    = 'Er trygdet/underattføring eller på overgangsstønad' 
    Spm41f    = 'Er annet' 
    Spm42a    = 'Er arbeidsledig' 
    Spm42b    = 'Er på tiltak eller arbeidssøkende' 
    Spm42c    = 'Er student eller skoleelev' 
    Spm42d    = 'Er hjemmearbeidende' 
    Spm42e    = 'Er trygdet/under attføring eller har overgangsstønad' 
    Spm42f    = 'Er annet' 
    Spm43a    = 'Omfatter den oppgitte husleien strøm' 
    Spm43b    = 'Omfatter den oppgitte husleien oppvarming' 
    Spm43c    = 'Omfatter den oppgitte husleien bruk av vaskemaskin' 
    Spm43d    = 'Omfatter den oppgitte husleien biloppstillingsplass/garasje' 
    Spm43e    = 'Omfatter den oppgitte husleien kabel-tv' 
    Spm43f    = 'Omfatter den oppgitte husleien gangvask' 
    Spm43g    = 'Omfatter den oppgitte husleien snømåking' 
  /* Spm43tek  = 'Her står det noe, blank = blank' */ 
    Spm43h    = 'Omfatter den oppgitte husleien annet' 
    Spm43j    = 'Hva annet' 
    Spm44     = 'Har du/dere betalt depositum' 
    Spm45     = 'Hvor stort er depositumet for boligen' 
    Spm46_aa  = 'Når startet leieforholdet, år' 
    Spm46_mn  = 'Når startet leieforholdet måned' 
    Spm47     = 'Er det inngått skriftelig leiekontrakt' 
    Spm48     = 'Hindringer i boligen som gjør det vanskelig for rullestolbruker' 
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Descriptive statistics 
  Number of obs. Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
BorDu Bor du på adressen: 12155 1 2 1,4 0,489 
IOs_Alde IOs alder på intervjutidspunktet 12899 18 80 37,95 15,546 
AldGrupp IOs aldersgruppe 12899 1 5 2,21 0,798 
IOs_Kjon IOs kjønn 12899 1 2 1,47 0,499 
Landsdel Landsdel 12899 1 7 3,23 1,501 
Spm1 Hva slags hus eller leilighet bor du i? 12597 1 9 2,99 1,604 
Spm1a Er boligen en type leilighet 52 1 2 1,15 0,364 
Spm2 Er det innredet ekstra bolig i 
kjeller/loft 
7269 1 9 1,75 0,506 
Spm3 Bor i hoveddel av huset 2818 1 9 1,55 0,606 
Spm4 Er den delen av huset du bor i ... 1786 1 9 1,33 0,756 
Spm5 Eier boligen du bor i 12624 1 9 1,63 0,5 
Spm6 Eier boligen som selveier/gj 
borettslag/boligaksjeselskap 
4704 1 9 1,42 0,645 
Spm7 Deler boligen med noen 8641 1 9 1,42 0,52 
Spm8a Bor sammen med 
samboer/ektefelle/partner 
8164 1 2 1,58 0,494 
Spm8b Bor sammen med barn under 16 år 8166 1 2 1,76 0,427 
Spm8c Bor sammen med barn 16 år og 
oppover 
8166 1 2 1,95 0,224 
Spm8d Bor sammen med venner/kollektiv 8166 1 2 1,93 0,248 
Spm8e Bor sammen med foreldre 8166 1 2 1,98 0,128 
Spm8f Bor sammen med søsken 8166 1 2 1,98 0,143 
Spm8g Bor sammen med andre 8166 1 2 1,98 0,126 
Spm8h Antall barn under 16 år i boligen 2009 1 7 1,57 0,827 
Spm9 Eier noen av de du bor sammen med 
boligen 
4632 1 9 1,9 0,318 
Spm10a Samboer/ektefelle eier boligen 515 1 2 1,07 0,252 
Spm10b Barn under 16 år eier boligen 132 1 2 1,57 0,497 
Spm10c Barn 16 år og oppover eier boligen 133 1 2 1,41 0,493 
Spm10d Søsken eier boligen 103 1 2 1,65 0,479 
Spm10e Andre eier boligen 437 1 2 1,17 0,373 
Spm11 Leier du boligen eller disponerer du 
den 
7475 1 9 1,08 0,347 
Spm12 Leier du boligen av ... 6930 1 8 3,61 1,604 
Spm13 Bor du i samme bygning som eier 4581 1 9 1,63 0,495 
Spm14ja Har oppgitt areal 1764 1 9 1,28 0,599 
Spm14 Omtrent hvor mange kvadratmeter 
er boligen 
6502 3 999 
130,2
7 
225,54 
Spm15a_b Plassere boligen i et av følgende 
arealintervall 
1356 1 9 4,12 1,503 
Spm16 Hvor mange rom med vindu har 
boligen 
5084 0 99 2,73 2,302 
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Spm17 Hvor mange rom med badekar/dusj 
i boligen du leier 
4589 0 98 1,09 2,062 
Spm18 Har boligen tilgang på bad med 
dusj/badekar 
462 1 8 1,11 0,53 
Spm19 Antall toalett i boligen 4799 0 98 1,09 2,005 
Spm20a Har boligen eget 
kjøkken/kjøkkenkrok med vannkran 
5082 1 8 1,03 0,207 
Spm20b Har boligen tilgang til kjøkken 436 1 9 1,19 0,529 
Spm20c Har bod i boligen 4913 1 9 1,56 0,564 
Spm20d Har boligen bod på loft, kjeller 
eller andre steder 
4899 1 9 1,31 0,596 
Spm20e Har boligen uttak for egen 
vaskemaskin 
5004 1 9 1,19 0,506 
Spm20f Har boligen tilgang til vaskemaskin 1233 1 9 1,12 0,443 
Spm20g Har boligen egen 
balkong/terrasse/veranda/hage 
4996 1 9 1,42 0,55 
Spm20h Har boligen tilgang på 
balkong/terrasse m.m 
2255 1 9 1,56 0,544 
Spm20i Har boligen egen garasje eller 
garasjeplass 
4907 1 9 1,83 0,519 
Spm20j Har boligen garasje i fellesgarasje 4311 1 9 1,92 0,351 
Spm20k Har boligen egen 
biloppstillingsplass 
4864 1 9 1,52 0,678 
Spm20l Har boligen egen inngang 4702 1 9 1,26 0,54 
Spm20m Har boligen kabel-TV/parabol 4991 1 9 1,3 0,54 
Spm20n Har boligen varmekabler på bad 4785 1 9 1,41 0,577 
Spm20o Har boligen parkett/tregulv i stue 4969 1 9 1,48 0,649 
Spm20p Har boligen flislagt bad 4758 1 9 1,51 0,651 
Spm20q Har boligen bredbånd 4918 1 9 1,46 0,692 
Spm20r Har boligen åpen eller lukket peis 
for ved 
4951 1 9 1,7 0,55 
Spm21 I hvilken etasje ligger boligen 5057 1 9 2,9 1,735 
Spm22 Hvor mange soverom med vindu 
har boligen 
2439 0 98 2,42 2,253 
Spm23 Hvor mange andre oppholdsrom 
med vindu har boligen 
2398 0 99 1,87 4,14 
Spm24 Hvor mange rom med badekar eller 
dusj er det i boligen 
2416 0 99 1,23 2,84 
Spm25 Hvor mange toalett er det i boligen 2423 0 99 1,32 2,839 
Spm26a Har boligen kjeller 2389 1 9 1,36 0,585 
Spm26b Har boligen loft 2352 1 9 1,45 0,657 
Spm26c Har boligen garasje 2348 1 9 1,6 0,574 
Spm26d Har boligen sentralstøvsuger 2310 1 9 1,96 0,446 
Spm26e Har boligen kabel-TV/parabol 2378 1 9 1,42 0,555 
Spm26f Har boligen varmekabler på bad 2368 1 9 1,46 0,575 
Spm26g Har boligen parkett i stue 2337 1 9 1,45 0,707 
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Spm26h Har boligen flislagt bad 2330 1 9 1,67 0,738 
Spm26i Har boligen bredbånd 2308 1 9 1,53 0,723 
Spm26j Har boligen åpen eller lukket peis 
for ved 
2336 1 9 1,36 0,56 
Spm27 Har boligen mer enn ca. 200 m. fri 
sikt fra stuevinduet 
7042 1 9 1,4 0,665 
Spm28a Har boligen utsikt til fjord 8069 1 2 1,84 0,363 
Spm28b Har boligen utsikt til hav 8070 1 2 1,93 0,259 
Spm28c Har boligen utsikt til by eller bygd 8070 1 9 1,68 0,475 
Spm28d Har boligen utsikt til fjell 8070 1 9 1,78 0,421 
Spm28e Har boligen utsikt til åker 8070 1 9 1,88 0,34 
Spm28f Har boligen utsikt til skog 8070 1 9 1,74 0,447 
Spm28g Har boligen utsikt til 
industriområde 
8070 1 2 1,93 0,261 
Spm28h Har boligen utsikt til trafikkert vei 8070 1 2 1,74 0,437 
Spm28i Har boligen utsikt til jernbanelinje 8070 1 2 1,96 0,197 
Spm28j Har boligen utsikt til annet 8070 1 2 1,91 0,289 
Spm29 Hva slags bebyggelse er det i 
nabolaget 
7058 1 9 3,04 1,636 
Spm30 Leier du boligen møblert, delvis 
møblert 
7016 1 9 2,74 0,622 
Spm31 Avtale med utleier om å utføre ulike 
typer arbeidsoppgaver 
7008 1 9 1,75 0,571 
Spm32a Hagearbeid f.eks klippe og/eller 
vanne plen 
6590 1 2 1,86 0,344 
Spm32b Måke snø, rydde innkjørsel o.l. 6590 1 2 1,82 0,387 
Spm32c Vaske fellesareal f.eks. oppgang, 
trapp 
6590 1 2 1,87 0,338 
Spm32d Pass av barn 6590 1 2 2 0,056 
Spm32e Pass av hund/katt 6590 1 2 2 0,064 
Spm32f Oppussing/oppgradering av 
standarden til boligen 
6590 1 2 1,97 0,172 
Spm32g Forefallende håndverk, elektriske 
justeringer 
6590 1 2 1,98 0,135 
Spm32h Rengjøring 6590 1 2 1,95 0,221 
Spm32i Annet forefallende arbeid 6590 1 2 1,96 0,194 
Spm33 Hvordan fikk du tak i boligen 6924 1 9 2,07 1,166 
Spm34 Husleie for boligen 6934 0 999999 
12690
,37 
86702,5
1 
Spm34a For hvilken måned gjelder husleien 5524 1 9 3,59 1,428 
Spm35 Hva er din andel av husleien 3592 0 999999 
11668
,84 
89205,7
4 
Spm36 Hvor mange bidrar til å betale 
husleien 
2695 0 99 2,01 4,042 
Spm37 Mottar du/dere støtte for å betale 
husle 
6886 1 9 1,88 0,557 
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Spm38a_1 kommunen betaler støtten 6181 1 2 1,88 0,322 
Spm38a_2 arbeidsgiver betaler støtten 6181 1 2 1,99 0,101 
Spm38a_3 andre betaler støtten 6180 1 2 1,95 0,214 
Spm39 Har du for tiden inntektsgivende 
arbeid 
7000 1 9 1,34 0,582 
Spm40 Jobber du heltid eller deltid 4810 1 9 1,26 0,488 
Spm41a Er ansatt eller selvstendig 
næringsdrivende 
6231 1 2 1,86 0,35 
Spm41b Er arbeidsledig og jobbsøkende 6231 1 2 1,98 0,141 
Spm41c Er på arbeidsmarkedstiltak 6231 1 2 1,99 0,082 
Spm41d Er student eller skoleelev 6231 1 2 1,92 0,278 
Spm41e Er trygdet/underattføring eller på 
overgangsstønad 
6231 1 2 1,94 0,239 
Spm41f Er annet 6231 1 2 1,97 0,163 
Spm42a Er arbeidsledig 6802 1 2 1,96 0,193 
Spm42b Er på tiltak eller arbeidssøkende 6802 1 2 1,97 0,18 
Spm42c Er student eller skoleelev 6801 1 2 1,94 0,243 
Spm42d Er hjemmearbeidende 6802 1 2 1,99 0,102 
Spm42e Er trygdet/under attføring eller har 
overgangsstønad 
6802 1 2 1,81 0,394 
Spm42f Er annet 6802 1 2 1,95 0,223 
Spm43a Omfatter den oppgitte husleien 
strøm 
6942 1 9 1,86 0,52 
Spm43b Omfatter den oppgitte husleien 
oppvarming 
6895 1 9 1,79 0,583 
Spm43c Omfatter den oppgitte husleien 
bruk av vaskemaskin 
4231 1 9 1,75 0,513 
Spm43d Omfatter den oppgitte husleien 
biloppstillingsplass/garasje 
5461 1 9 1,45 0,622 
Spm43e Omfatter den oppgitte husleien 
kabel-tv 
5899 1 9 1,55 0,647 
Spm43f Omfatter den oppgitte husleien 
gangvask 
6823 1 9 1,8 0,671 
Spm43g Omfatter den oppgitte husleien 
snømåking 
3843 1 9 1,7 0,95 
Spm43h Omfatter den oppgitte husleien 
annet 
8226 1 2 1,44 0,496 
Spm44 Har du/dere betalt depositum 6992 1 9 1,59 0,852 
Spm45 Hvor stort er depositumet for 
boligen 
3371 0 999999 
32949
,13 
134189,
955 
Spm46_aa Når startet leieforholdet, år 4011 109 2020 
2002,
14 
32,234 
Spm46_mn Når startet leieforholdet måned 3928 1 12 6,66 3,128 
Spm47 Er det inngått skriftelig leiekontrakt 7025 1 9 1,19 0,719 
Spm48 Hindringer i boligen som gjør det 
vanskelig for rullestolbruker 
7070 1 9 1,3 0,718 
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sp26_1 Utført utbedring/oppussing etter 
innflytting 
12232 1 2 1,74 0,439 
inntekt Inntekt 12834 1 5 2,47 0,915 
       
 
